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Looking At Versus Looking Along
In an article originally published in The Coventry Evening Telegraph, C. S. Lewis wrote of
an experience he had while standing in a dark toolshed: "The sun was shining outside and
through the crack at the top of the door there came a sunbeam ... Everything else was almost
pitch-black. I was seeing the beam, not seeing things by it."! He then moved so that the beam fell
on his eyes: "Instantly the whole previous picture vanished. I saw no toolshed, and (above all) no
beam. Instead I saw, framed in the irregular cranny at the top of the door, green leaves moving
on the branches of a tree outside and beyond that, 90 odd million miles away, the sun.'? After
meditating on this rather commonplace occurrence, he concluded: "Looking along the beam, and
looking at the beam are very different experiences."?
Examples of the distinction between looking at and looking along can be seen throughout
human experience. It is one thing to look at the nature of love, noting its psychological and
biological characteristics, quite another to fall in love, to have every other moment until then
look insignificant in comparison. Lewis tells the story of a young man who meets a girl:
The whole world looks different when he sees her. Her voice reminds him of
something he has been trying to remember all his life, and ten minutes casual chat
with her is more precious than all the favours that all other women in the world could
grant. He is, as they say, 'in love'."




Along comes a scientist who looks at the young man's experience from the outside and describes
it as being "all an affair of the young man's genes and a recognized biological stimulus." For
Lewis, "That is the difference between looking along the sexual impulse and looking at it." Or
take the mathematician who sits contemplating what he believes to be "timeless and spaceless
truths about quantity."? But along comes the cerebral physiologist, who "if he could look inside
the mathematician's head, would find nothing timeless and spaceless there-only tiny
movements in the grey matter." So what is the true or valid experience? Which gives the
clearest account of reality, looking at or looking along?
According to Lewis, in recent history, the answer has simply been taken for granted:
"The people who look at things have had it all their own way; the people who look along things
have simply been brow-beaten." If you want the true account of the sexual impulse you go to the
scientist, not to the lover. If you want the true account of religion you go to the philosophers of
religion, not to the religious. The more accurate account comes from outside explanation rather
than inside participation. Lewis argues that this has served to be the foundation of all 'Modem'
thought. Elsewhere he says: "It has even come to be taken for granted that the external account
of a thing somehow refutes or 'debunks' the account given from the inside.'?" To oversimplify
the matter, in the Modem age the scientist trumps the poet. But is this truly the case?
To be sure, there are instances where explaining from the outside gives a more objective








we're in love, may really be a very plain, stupid, and disagreeable person.?" So, the question
remains: "Having been so often deceived by looking along, are we not well advised to trust only
to looking at?-in fact to discount all these inside experiences'z?" By no means! Lewis presents
two main objections to this dangerous mode of thought. First: "You discount them in order to
think more accurately. But you can't think at all-and therefore, of course, can't think
accurately-if you having nothing to think about?" The physiologist could look at pain and find
out that it exists-"But the word pain would have no meaning for him unless he had 'been
inside' by actually suffering. Ifhe had never looked along pain he simply wouldn't know what
he was looking at?" Second, "you can step outside one experience only by stepping inside
another.':" In other words, the premise is self-defeating because looking at necessarily involves
looking along. One begins to wonder, with Lewis, where does this nonsense end? Put rather
simply: "The answer is that we must never allow the rot to begin. We must, on pain of idiocy,
deny from the very outset the idea that looking at is, by its own nature, intrinsically truer or
better than looking along. One must look both along and at everything.'?"
Applied to Theology
In theology there is also a distinction between looking at and looking along." When done
properly, theology should seek to look at doctrine in a way that will serve looking along the







I? This distinction has parallels with Gerhard Forde's terms of 'primary' and 'secondary' theology addressed in
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between lived experience and believed language, where the experience of looking at can repress
looking along, or the experience of looking along can repress the experience of looking at. In
The Idea of the Holy, Rudolf Otto 18 maintains that in current Western theological discourse the
former is most often the case (looking at repressing looking along). He argues that the non-
rational elements in the idea of the divine have been overshadowed and repressed by the excess
of rational attributions." On the one hand, this is to be expected, for theology deals with words,
and as Otto states:
All language, in so far as it consists of words, purports to convey ideas or concepts.--
that is what language means;--and the more clearly and unequivocally it does so, the
better the language. And hence expositions of religious truth in language inevitably
tend to stress the' rational' attributes of God.20
But throughout the years, these rationalistic expositions of religious truth failed to provide room
for non-rational components such as the religious experience of the numinous." According to
Otto, this was not because orthodox Christianity was preoccupied with the framing of doctrine,
for this endeavor was shared by the most extreme of mystics, but rather that in its framing of
Theology is/or Proclamation (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1990).
18 Otto's work should be viewed with caution and his inclusion in this paper should not be seen as an
endorsement. Nevertheless, his work does help to illustrate a point.
19 It is important to note that by 'non-rational' Otto does not mean 'irrational.' Anders Nygren demonstrates
this qualification well in his work Agape and Eros, and while he is dealing specifically with the Agape motif, it
remains relevant for our current undertaking: "There is in many quarters today an unhealthy cult of the paradoxical
and irrational, almost as if the lack of clarity and consistency were sufficient evidence of religious or Christian truth.
When we describe the idea of Agape as paradoxical and irrational, we do not for a moment suggest that it contains
any logical contradiction or implies a credo quia absurdum. The idea of Agape is by no means self-contradictory.
On the contrary it is a quite simple and clear and easily comprehensible idea. It is paradoxical and irrational only
inasmuch as it means a transvaluation of all previously accepted values." Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London:
SPCK, 1953),204.
20 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non Rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine, 2nd ed.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1958),2.
21 It is rather ironic that Otto utilized a rational European method in order to arrive at the conclusion that
Christianity had a one-sidedly intellectualistic and rationalistic interpretation. Thus, his argument seems to become
self-defeating. But again, his assessment does help illustrate a point.
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doctrine orthodox Christianity found "no way to do justice to the non-rational aspect of its
subject.'?" What, then, was the result?
So far from keeping the non-rational element in religion alive in the heart of the
religious experience, orthodox Christianity manifestly failed to recognize its value,
and by this failure gave to the idea of God a one-sidedly intellectualistic and
rationalistic interpretation."
This has far-reaching consequences for the theological task. Regarding Lutheran
theological discourse, Otto argues that it "has itself not done justice to the numinous side of the
Christian idea of God,'?' and though Otto's method may undermine his findings, his assessment
does help illustrate a point. While in the life and thought of Luther one could see the tension and
interplay between rational and non-rational expressions, from Johann Gerhardt onwards
Lutheranism "was returning to the doctrine of divine 'apatheia' or passionlessness.''" Otto
maintained that it was Schleiermacher who first attempted to overcome this rationalism that
inevitably led to 'apatheia.:" and it will be the "task for contemporary Christian teaching to
follow in his traces and again to deepen the rational meaning of the Christian conception of God
by permeating it with its non-rational elements.':" In doing this, the tension between non-rational
experience and intellectual language can be maintained without leading to either extreme
rationalism or mysticism. One is free to look both along and at existence and being, for looking
along and at exist in symbiotic relationship. However, while both are necessary, it is important to





26 As with Otto, it seems rather ironic that Schleiermacher attempted to overcome this one-sidedly
intellectualistic interpretation by seeking to reconcile Christianity with Enlightenment criticisms (thus creating a
'rational' synthesis).
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larger and more important than having knowledge.'?" Some, however, have seen Lutheran
theology as reversing this maxim, where proper knowledge is something larger and more
important than living," where looking at somehow debunks looking along.
A Critique of Dialectic Lutheranism
Lutherans have at times been accused of over-systematizing law and gospel into a strict
dialectic framework," which can in turn lead to a sort of antinomianism or strident moralism.
According to this critique, justification serves as a ceiling where the law is seen as the bad news
and the gospel is seen as the good news. Richard John Neuhaus points this out in his article, "On
Loving the Law of God," which is based upon an essay written by the Lutheran moral-
theologian, Gilbert Meilaender. Towards the beginning of the article, Neuhaus shares the story of
an experience he had while he was a young Lutheran seminarian:
I was struck by a professor's forceful declaration that the phrase growth in grace is a
contradiction in terms. The grace of the gospel of forgiveness is absolute, unqualified,
perfect. It allows for no growth or improvement. The law of God, stating what God
demands of us, is the enemy, from which our only refuge is the gospel. Put simply--
but upon it entire theological systems have been constructed-the law is the bad news
and the gospel is the good news."
27 Ibid., 108.
28 GustafWingren, "The Doctrine of Creation: Not an Appendix but the First Article," Word & World IV (Fall
1984): 355.
29 This type of generalization can be dangerous due to its relative nature. For instance, someone who views
looking along as a truer or more valid form of knowledge might be skeptical of any doctrinal language that asserts
boundaries when looking at. The real question, then, should be what is the proper balance between looking along
and looking at, between experiential primary discourse and linguistic secondary discourse (which is also an
experience, but of a different kind).
30 Applied to the previous discussion, this strict dialectic could function as the scientist who looks at the young
man who is 'in love' and explains it all as an affair of the young man's genes. While this explanation in a sense is
true, it does not do justice to the full extent of the reality of the existential experience of looking along. Concerning
dialectic Lutheranism, the dialectic experience of the cross/resurrection motif may be true, but it is not the sole
motif, and by itself it can fail to due justice to the full extent of God's one reconciling work in Christ. It could also
be argued that strict dialectic Lutheranism is based solely on experience, on being killed and made alive. But the
reality must be that through this dialectic experience there is also linear growth in sanctification.
31 Richard John Neuhaus, "On Loving Law of God," First Things 190 (February 2009): 61.
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Neuhaus refers to this view of the function of law and gospel as the "dialectic" framework,
where the Christian is addressed as either 'despairing man' (with the gospel) or 'complacent
man' (with the law)."
Regarding the dialectic framework of law and gospel, Gilbert Meilaender writes in his
essay, "Hearts Set to Obey":
Grace is in no sense a power that enables us to become 'more and more' what God
wills we should be; rather, grace is pardon that announces God's acceptance of the
sinner and thereby elicits the faith that puts sinners in right relation with God. That
grace having been announced, there is no more to be said=-other than to say it 'again
and again.?'
Neuhaus points out that closely connected to this dialectic framework of law and gospel is the
key Lutheran phrase simul Justus et peccator-"always, and at the same time, both justified and
sinner." To clarify, neither Meilaender nor Neuhaus are advocating a full rejection of the
dialectic framework of law and gospel; rather, as Neuhaus points out in his article:
Meilaender makes clear that he is offering a critique of a "a certain understanding of
Lutheranism" that in its law-gospel dialectic "eventually arrives at a kind of practical
antinomianism-which is all too readily accompanied by a strident moralism-but
that, were it consistent, would have no reason to pray that our hearts may be set to
obey God's commandments.?"
32 In order to further address Neuhaus' concerns, a brief overview of the distinction between law and gospel
could be of service. When examining law and gospel, it is helpful to distinguish between a broad and narrow sense.
When taken in their broad sense, law and gospel do not differ, and the law is not seen as the bad news while the
gospel is the good news. As the Christian Cyclopedia, ed. Erwin L. Lueker, Luther Poellot, and Paul Jackson (Saint
Louis: Concordia, 2000) puts it: "They do not contradict each other. Both are God's Word; both are in the OT and
NT; both are to be applied to people everywhere, including Christians." But, when taken in their narrow sense, there
are distinct differences between law and gospel: "Differences: (a) The Law was written into man's heart: the Gospel
is not known by nature, but was revealed through Jesus and the Word of God. (b) The Law contains commandments
of what we are to do and not to do and how we are to be; the Gospel reveals what God has done and still does for
our salvation. (c) The Law promises eternal life conditionally; the Gospel promises it freely. (d) The Law demands
perfect fulfillment and pronounces curses and threats if there is no perfect fulfillment; the Gospel has only promises
and comforting assurances. (e) The purpose of the Law is to serve as a curb, mirror, and rule (see also FC VI); the
purpose of the Gospel is to forgive sins and give heaven and salvation as a free gift."
33 Gilbert Meilaender, "Hearts Set to Obey," in I Am the Lord Your God: Christian Reflections on the Ten
Commandments, ed. Carl Braaten and Christopher Seitz (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 260.
34 Neuhaus, "On Loving the Law of God," 62.
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What, then, are Neuhaus and Meilaender advocating as the proper attitude toward the interaction
between law and gospel?
In response to an overly systematic dialectic framework where justification serves as a
ceiling, both Neuhaus and Meilaender seem to be advocating a linear framework of sanctification
that fully engages the dialectic framework. Meilaender writes:
It is in no way contrary to the life of discipleship, that we should, again and again,
experience ourselves as simply caught in the tension between the reality of our sin
and the reality of God's forgiveness. What is contrary to the path of discipleship is
that we should rest content in that static condition, that we should not in prayer strain
against it as we ask Christ's Spirit to make the history of redemption an ever more
effective reality in what we think, say, and do. 'Strive,' says the Letter to the
Hebrews, 'for the holiness without which no one will see the Lord. '35
In other words, the dialectic framework is not in itself problematic," but by itself it can be
problematic. For, when the dialectic framework operates as a ceiling then there is nothing to be
done except hear the word of law as 'complacent man,' or the word of gospel as 'despairing
man.':" This should be seen as problematic because it fails to provide room for human
experiences outside of despair and complacency. A possible negative result of this is that
theological language can fail to leave room for the full extent of human experience, leading to a
further compartmentalization where formal doctrine is divorced from lived reality. How, then,
does this apply to the distinction between looking at and looking along?
35 Meilaender, "Hearts Set to Obey," 257.
36 In fact, regarding justification and the person and work of Christ, the dialectic framework should be seen as
absolutely correct, for the grace shown in the gospel of forgiveness is absolute, unqualified, and perfect. There can
be no room for growth or improvement because grace is all God's action in Christ. The attempt to do something
inevitably leads to self-justification rather than justification of the selfby God. In this context, the law appears to be
bad news because it is God on our backs, a pointed finger, and an accusation. At this point the only refuge is the
gospel, the good news that is absolute, unqualified, and perfect without room for growth. Through this lens the
Christian must consistently be sent back to square one, back to the Cross-Crux sola est nostra theologia.
37 While the law should be spoken to 'complacent man' and the gospel to 'despairing man,' it is dangerous to
maintain that an individual is always either complacent or despairing, for this fails to take into account the varieties
of human experience.
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Theological discourse should not look at theological themes in vacuo. Rather, faithful
theological discourse should seek to look at theological themes in a way that serves looking
along the Christian life within the wider story of creation, fall, incarnation, redemption, and
eschaton. For instance, regarding sanctification and the continuing work ofthe Holy Spirit, there
is room for growth in the love and knowledge of God where the law is not seen as bad news. As
Bonhoeffer states, "It is grace to know God's cornmandments.?" As the psalmist cries in Psalm
119, we should love, cherish, and exult the law of God. And, as Christians have prayed since at
least the Seventh Century, we should pray: "0 God, from whom come all holy desires, all good
counsels, and all just works: Give to us, your servants, that peace which the world cannot give,
that our hearts may be set to obey your cornmandments.?" But, does this then compromise the
doctrinal integrity of the dialectic framework?
Through the lens of sanctification Lutherans can see the good news of the law as God's
intended structure for human life. Through this lens Lutherans may agree with the "linear"
framework of Catholicism, where "the Christian life is understood as a via, a journey (destined
-ultimately to end in the vision of God)."40This journey, where the law is seen as the good
structure for human life, can only take place if it is rooted in the gospel Word that transforms us
and gives us a new identity extra nos. This in no way contradicts justification and the dialectic
framework of law and gospel. Rather, the dialectic and linear frameworks function as two
different angles which describe the one reconciling work of God in Christ. Meilaender, after
reflecting on George Hunsinger's essay titled "What Karl Barth Leamed from Martin Luther,"
puts it this way:
38 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Psalms: The Prayerbook of the Bible (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1970), 31.
39 Meilaender, "Hearts Set to Obey," 253.
40Ibid., 259.
9
The terms 'justification' and 'sanctification' point not to different works of God but
to two different angles-pardon and power-from which to describe the one work of
God in Christ, reconciling the world to himself. These are different ways of
describing how God's Spirit draws our lives into the story of Jesus. The language of
pardon addresses a truth of our experience-the continuing lure of sin. The language
of power articulates the truth of reality-that God is at work, fulfilling his promise to
turn sinners into saints."
Placed within the categories of looking at and looking along, living the Christian life
necessarily includes looking both at and along justification and sanctification as they reflect
God's one reconciling work. An overly strict dialectic framework can be seen as relying too
heavily upon the experience oflooking at and along the angle of justification (which can fail to
leave room for sanctification). An overly strict linear framework can be seen as relying too
heavily upon the experience of looking at and along the angle of sanctification (which can fail to
leave room for justification). In response to this, both justification and sanctification must be
proclaimed full force, so as not to turn into a zero-sum game. What should distinguish them is
not necessarily the order in which they are applied, but rather the circumstances to which they
are applied. Meilaender, again, helps clarify the matter:
To those who are troubled in their hearts and tempted to despair, God's word of grace
must be spoken as sheer pardon, free of any demand that might be heard as an
accusation. Only grace as pardon can draw the despairing out of themselves, teach
them not to look inward (which is, after all, their problem), but outward to the
righteousness of Christ. To those who trust that by God's grace they are no longer in
bondage to sin and who seek, however haltingly and imperfectly, to bring their lives
into obedience to his will, the gift and guidance of God's empowering grace should
be offered. Thus, the distinction between justification and sanctification lies not in
some wooden order of priority, but is a pastoral art, the skill of discerning whether
grace as pardon or as power is needed. And the distinction between these languages is




The question, however, remains as to how the 'angles' of the dialectic and linear
frameworks intersect in the life of the believer so that system serves story and knowledge serves
living. This is a necessary issue to address, for our secondary discourse about God (such as talk
about justification and sanctification), must foster and drive to primary discourse in relationship
with God. As was mentioned earlier, our theological secondary discourse has often approached
the idea of God according to a one-sidedly intellectualistic and rationalistic interpretation. How,
then, does one go about permeating the Christian conception of God with non-rational elements
while retaining the proper orthodox theological boundaries? How can the poet be welcomed into
an arena that in Modern times has often been ruled by the scientist? This cannot simply be
taught, rather-"it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes' of the
spirit' must be awakened.'?" One individual who excelled in doing this was C. S. Lewis. By
further examining his life and thought we might be better equipped to do the same.
43 Otto, The Idea a/the Holy, 7.
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CHAPTER TWO
An Introduction to C. S. Lewis' Sehnsucht
In his spiritual autobiography, Surprised by Joy, C. S. Lewis recounts three distinct
experiences that made a profound impact on his life. The first was the memory of a memory-as
he stood by a flowering currant bush on a summer day, there arose in him the memory of when
his older brother had brought a toy garden into his childhood nursery. Here he was first
confronted with beauty: "What the real garden had failed to do, the toy garden did. It made me
aware of nature-not, indeed, as a storehouse of forms and colors but as something cool, dewy,
fresh, exuberant."! The memory of this memory aroused in young Lewis a sensation that "had
taken only a moment of time," but made everything else that had ever happened to him
"insignificant in comparison."? It was a longing, but longing for what? A desire, but desire for
what? And before he could answer, "the desire itself was gone, the whole glimpse withdrawn,
the world turned commonplace again, or only stirred by a longing for the longing that had just
ceased."?
The second occurred while reading the children's book Squirrel Nutkin by Beatrix Potter,"
where he became enamored with' Autumness' and was overcome by an experience that "was
something quite different from ordinary life and even from ordinary pleasure; something, as they





would now say, 'in another dimension.'?' As before, the sensation was one of intense longing
and desire: "And one went back to the book, not to gratify the desire (that was impossible-how
can one possess Autumn?) but to reawake it.:"
The third came while reading the unrhymed translation of Tegner 's Drapa:
I heard a voice that cried,
Balder the beautiful
Is dead, is dead-7
Lewis reminisced, "I knew nothing about Balder; but instantly I was uplifted into huge regions of
northern sky .... and then, as in the other examples, found myself at the very same moment
already falling out of that desire and wishing I were back in it."" Once Lewis had tasted this
sensation, he believed that to '''have it again' was the supreme and only important object of
desire."?
While these three distinct experiences reflected C. S. Lewis' personal encounters with what
he called Sehnsucht," he maintained that the experience is both common and commonly
misunderstood. Due to its non-rational character, Sehnsucht is often experienced but seldom
talked about. It is looked along, but when it is looked at one quickly realizes the paucity of
words. In fact, one could argue that unless an individual has looked along and experienced






10 Sehnsucht is a German term with no direct English equivalent. It is roughly translated as "longing." From
this point forward the words 'Joy,' Sehnsucht, and 'Desire' will be used interchangeably as technical terms that refer
to Lewis' specific understanding of this unique experience.
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reference. It would be like trying to explain the physical sensations of the sexual impulse to
someone who is pre-pubescent. Because of this, offering a concrete definition proves to be rather
difficult, and instead, the essence of Sehnsucht must be evoked, alluded to, and awakened. II
The Thesis Statement
Together, the experiences and glimpses of what Lewis called' Joy' or Sehnsucht served as
the central thread of his life" and provided him with the ontological lens through which he
viewed reality. 13 It is the plan of this paper to further examine Lewis' treatment of Sehnsucht" by
engaging it in dialogue with a Lutheran theological perspective. In doing so, there are two main
objectives that I hope to accomplish. The first objective is to demonstrate that the experience of
Sehnsucht should not be merely dismissed or fully embraced; rather, it should be placed within a
proper theological narrative that allows 'Romanticism' (in Lewis' peculiar sense)" and reason to
II In order to further clarify what Lewis meant by Sehnsucht, and in an attempt to correct some
misunderstandings of it, please refer to Appendix One, where I briefly write of its workings in my own life.
12 After recounting his experiences with Sehnsucht, Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 17, writes: "The reader who finds
these three episodes of no interest need read this book no further, for in a sense the central story of my life is about
nothing else.".
13 At least until his conversion to Christianity.
14 This will serve as an introductory treatment of Lewis' Sehnsucht. For a more comprehensive treatment see
Corbin Scott Carnell, Bright Shadow of Reality: Spiritual Longing in C. S. Lewis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999).
15 In the Afterword to the Third Edition of The Pilgrim's Regress (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), Lewis says
of the term 'Romanticism' (p. 200): "I now believe it to be a word of such varying senses that it has become useless
and should be banished from our vocabulary." He goes on to provide at least seven definitions or interpretations of
what it is to be 'Romantic' (p. 201):
1) Stories about dangerous adventure
2) The marvelous is 'romantic'
3) The art dealing with 'Titanic' characters, emotions strained beyond the common pitch, and high-flown
sentiments or codes of honor is 'romantic'
4) 'Romanticism' can also mean the indulgence in abnormal, and finally anti-natural, moods
5) Egoism and Subjectivism are 'romantic'
6) Every revolt against existing civilization and conventions ... .is called 'romantic'
7) Sensibility to natural objects, when solemn and enthusiastic, is 'romantic'
But what Lewis meant by 'Romanticism' was not necessarily any of those seven things. In his words (p. 202):
14
run freely within their proper boundaries. The second objective is to warn the reader of the
inherent dangers in over-systematizing the language we use to set our theological boundaries, 16
for when this happens we are bound to compartmentalize theological belief and lived experience,
which leads to something far less then being fully human.
The underlying motivation for pursuing this topic is the perception that certain strands of
Lutheran theology have at times tended toward an over-systematization which fails to leave
room for non-rational components (such as Sehnsucht), and leads to what Otto refers to as divine
'apatheia.' This, again, can be seen as leading to a compartmentalization between theological
belief and lived experience, leaving the individual fragmented rather than reconciled.
"What I meant was a particular recurrent experience which dominated my childhood and adolescence and which I
hastily called 'Romantic' because inanimate nature and marvelous literature were among the things that evoked it. I
still believe that the experience is common, commonly misunderstood, and of immense importance: but I know now
that in other minds it arises under other stimuli and is entangled with other irrelevancies and that to bring it into the
forefront of consciousness is not so easy as I once supposed."
16 This can be seen, for instance, when the distinction between the language of law and gospel operates within





After recounting his early experiences with 'Joy,' Lewis goes on to warn that "The reader
who finds these three episodes of no interest need read this book no further," for without living
the experience the experience itself would have no meaning. Just as the word pain would have
no meaning for the physiologist unless he had been inside suffering, so also Joy would have no
meaning for the reader unless he had been on the inside of spiritual longing and unsatisfied
desire. What, then, is Joy or Sehnsucht according to Lewis?
Instead of giving a definition, per se, Lewis underlines the shared qualities and
characteristics to his experiences with Sehnsucht. This is because, as Otto states regarding non-
rational entities-"it can only be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything that comes' of the
spirit' must be awakened." With this in mind, Lewis says, "It is that of an unsatisfied desire
which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction."? He refers to it as Joy, Sehnsucht, or
Desire, but he uses these as technical terms that must be distinguished from happiness or
pleasure: "Joy (in my sense) has indeed one characteristic, and one only, in common with them;
the fact that anyone who has experienced it will want it again.?' While happiness and pleasure
can often be found or manufactured, Joy appears on its own terms, and once it is realized, the
'Ibid., 17-18.
2 Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 7.
3 Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 18.
4 Ibid., 18.
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experience is gone. Because of this it contains an element of grief, for one is left alienated from
the unknown object of desire, and in its place is left only the glimpse of a memory or the longing
for longing. But in saying this, Lewis argues that it is a kind of bittersweet grief, a kind of grief
we want: "I doubt whether anyone who has tasted it would ever, if both were in his power,
exchange it for all the pleasures in the world. But then Joy is never in our power and pleasure
often is." If not happiness or pleasure then could it just be characterized as another form of
aesthetic pleasure or nostalgia for the past?
In his well-known sermon, The Weight of Glory, Lewis addresses those who claim that
Joy is merely the admiration of beauty or longing for the past:
In speaking of this desire for our own far-off country, which we find in ourselves
even now, I feel a certain shyness. I am almost committing an indecency. I am trying
to rip open the inconsolable secret in each one of you-the secret which hurts so
much that you take your revenge on it by calling it names like Nostalgia and
Romanticism and Adolescence; the secret also which pierces with such sweetness
that when, in very intimate conversation, the mention of it becomes imminent, we
grow awkward and affect to laugh at ourselves; the secret we cannot hide and cannot
tell, though we desire to do both. We cannot tell it because it is a desire for something
that has never actually appeared in our experience. We cannot hide it because our
experience is constantly suggesting it, and we betray ourselves like lovers at the
mention of a name. Our commonest expedient is to call it beauty and behave as if that
had settled the matter. Wordsworth's expedient was to identify it with certain
moments in his own past. But all this is a cheat,"
The attempt to resolve the tension of Sehnsucht by either desiring desire or seeking to satisfy
unsatisfied desire ends up being a cheat, for it is neither the experience itself nor the stimuli that
aroused the experience that is desired. Lewis continues:
If Wordsworth had gone back to those moments in the past, he would not have found
the thing itself, but only the reminder of it; what he remembered would turn out to be
itself a remembering. The books or the music in which we thought the beauty was
located will betray us if we trust to them; it was not in them, it only came through
5 Ibid., 18.
6 C. S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses (New York: Macmillan, 1949),4.
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them, and what came through them was longing. These things-the beauty, the
memory of our own past-are good images of what we really desire; but if they are
mistaken for the thing itself they turn into dumb idols, breaking the hearts of their
worshippers. For they are not the thing itself; they are only the scent of a flower we
have not found, the echo of a tune we have not heard, news from a country we have
never yet visited.'
Desiring desire or seeking to satisfy unsatisfied desire inevitably leaves one unfulfilled and
wanting more.
Desiring Desire
Two things distinguish Sehnsucht from other forms of longing. First, "though the sense of
want is acute and even painful, yet the mere wanting is felt to be somehow a delight." While
other desires and longings seem to be pleasurable only if their satisfaction is within reach,
Sehnsucht is felt as pleasurable even when the object of satisfaction is neither known or within
reach. Because of this, when the delight of Desire is long absent, one begins to desire Desire,
"and that new desiring becomes a new instance of the original desire." While this can seem
confusing, Lewis claims that it is simple and easily recognized when we live it: "'Oh to feel as I
did then!' we cry; not noticing that even while we say the words the very feeling whose loss we
lament is rising again in all its old bitter-sweetness.'?" Because of this, Sehnsucht is unique from
other forms of longing and desire. Even though the desire remains unsatisfied, the lines between
wanting and having are blurred-"To have it is, by definition, a want: to want it, we find, is to
have it."!' Yet the moment we realize that we have it, and the moment we stop to look at it, is the
7 Ibid., 4-5.





moment it disappears. In order to explain this phenomenon, Lewis was heavily influenced by the
Australian-born British philosopher, Samuel Alexander, in his work Space, Time, and Deity. 12
Enjoyment and Contemplation
Alexander's theory of "Enjoyment" and "Contemplation?" played a pivotal role in Lewis'
intellectualjoumey towards Christianity, and Lewis' explanation of the distinction is worth full
mention:
"Enjoyment" has nothing to do with pleasure, nor "Contemplation" with the
contemplative life. When you see a table you "enjoy" the act of seeing and
"contemplate" the table. Later, if you took up Optics and thought about Seeing itself,
you would be contemplating the seeing and enjoying the thought. In bereavement you
contemplate the beloved and the beloved's death and, in Alexander's sense, "enjoy"
the loneliness and grief; but a psychologist, if he were considering you as a case of
melancholia, would be contemplating your grief and enjoying psychology. We do not
"think a thought" in the same sense in which we "think that Herodotus is unreliable."
When we think a thought, "thought" is a cognate accusative (like "blow" in "strike a
blow"). We enjoy the thought (that Herodotus is unreliable) and, in so doing,
contemplate the unreliability of Herodotus. 14
Lewis argues that instead of the twofold division of the Conscious and the Unconscious, there
should be a threefold division of the Unconscious, the Contemplated, and the Enjoyed," because
Contemplating and Enjoying are incompatible (in the sense that they cannot occur
simultaneously)." The moment you start contemplating the enjoyed is the moment enjoyment
stops. Lewis applies this distinction to pleasure saying, "The surest way of spoiling a pleasure
12 Samuel Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (London: Macmillan, 1920). Alexander gave the Gifford
Lectures at Glasgow in 1916-1918. These were later published as Space, Time, and Deity.
13 "Enjoyment" and "Contemplation" are merely another way of saying looking along and looking at.
14 Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 217-18.
15 Ibid., 219.
16 To be sure, there are defmite arbitrary limitations in defming these complex concepts, but the terms helped
serve Lewis' purpose and point.
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was to start examining your satisfaction.':" How, then, did this relate to Lewis' concept of
Sehnsucht?
Once Lewis grasped the distinction between "Enjoyment" and "Contemplation" he was
able to see its workings in his experiences with Joy: "I saw that all my waitings and watchings
for Joy, all my vain hopes to find some mental content on which I could, so to speak, lay my
finger and say, 'This is it,' had been a futile attempt to contemplate the enjoyed.':" In desiring
Desire all Lewis could find was "not the wave" but rather "the wave's imprint on the sand. "19
This realization freed Lewis from deifying Joy and led him to seek Desire's object rather than
Desire itself. In the end, Joy was merely a reminder and a pointer saying-"Look! Look! What
do I remind you of?"?" In order to come to this realization, however, he had to follow the
dialectic of desire, which for Lewis served as a sort of lived ontological proof.
Seeking to Satisfy Unsatisfied Desire
Lewis believed that if one truly followed the desire of Sehnsucht and resolutely abandoned
false illusions of satisfaction, then "he must come out at last into the clear knowledge that the
human soul was made to enjoy some object that is never fully given-nay, cannot even be
imagined as given-in our present mode of subjective and spatio-temporal experience.'?' This
argument rested on the premise that nature makes nothing in vain. Although hunger does not
prove that we shall eat, it does prove that we live in a world where there is food. While thirst
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thing as water. Lewis believed that Joy was a natural desire, and since nature makes nothing in
vain, there must be satisfaction for that desire. While it is easy to head in wrong directions and
pursue false objects that promise satisfaction, they inevitably turn out to be dumb idols. But
Desire itself contained the corrective to these errors:
The only fatal error was to pretend that you had passed from desire to fruition, when,
in reality, you had found either nothing, or desire itself, or the satisfaction of some
different desire. The dialectic of Desire, faithfully followed, would retrieve all
mistakes, head you off from all false paths, and force you not to propound, but to live
through, a sort of ontological proof. This lived dialectic, and the merely argued
dialectic of my philosophical progress, seemed to have converged on one goal."
This goal, according to Lewis, is glory.
The Weight of Glory
Originally preached as a sermon in the Church ofSt. Mary the Virgin in 1942, The Weight
of Glory has become one ofC. S. Lewis' most famous theological works. He begins by
examining the apparent shift from a positive to a negative view of virtue: "If you asked twenty
good men today what they thought the highest of the virtues, nineteen of them would reply,
Unselfishness. But if you asked almost any of the great Christians of old he would have replied,
Love.'?" Lewis sees this shift as being of utmost importance, for "the negative ideal of
Unselfishness carries with it the suggestion not primarily of securing good things for others, but
of going without them ourselves, as if our abstinence and not their happiness was the important
point.'?' The problem with this negative view of virtue, according to Lewis, is that it fails to line
up with the New Testament. While there are numerous sections that deal with self-denial, these
were never meant to serve as an end or destination.
22 Ibid., 205.
23 C. S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory, 1.
24 Ibid., 1.
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After detailing the apparent shift from a positive to a negative view of virtue, Lewis
continues to present his well-known appeal to desire. While we are told to pick up our crosses
and follow Christ, Lewis argues, "nearly every description of what we shall ultimately find if we
do so contains an appeal to desire.'?' But the notion of desire often raises suspicion-for can one
really trust desire? While desire can be directed towards good or evil, it should not be discounted
altogether: "If there lurks in most modern minds the notion that to desire our own good and
earnestly to hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad thing, I submit that this notion has crept in from
Kant and the Stoics and is not part of the Christian faith.?" At this point Lewis suggests an idea
that seems foreign to many accents of Christianity:
Our Lord finds our desires, not too strong, but too weak. We are half-hearted
creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered
us, like an ignorant child who wants to go on making mud pies in a slum because he
cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We are far too
easily pleased."
This, then, could make Christianity appear like a mercenary affair, where individuals are
rewarded for what they believe, think, say, or do. But Lewis argues that there are different types
of reward, and certain rewards are the natural fulfillment of the activity itself. In his words, "The
proper rewards are not simply tacked on to the activity for which they are given, but are the
activity itself in consummation.?" According to Lewis, for the Christian heaven is merely the
consummation of the activity of his earthly discipleship. However, those "who have not yet
attained it cannot know this in the same way, and cannot even begin to know it at all except by






desire the ultimate reward.'?" Because ofthis, as our desire for obedience grows so will our fear
of God's wrath dissipate and be recognized as an absurdity." But, Lewis warns, "this will not,
for most of us, happen in a day; poetry replaces grammar, gospel replaces law, longing
transforms obedience, as gradually as the tide lifts a grounded ship.'?'
Because mankind was made for heaven, Lewis believed that "the desire for our proper
place will be already in us, but not yet attached to the true object, and will even appear as the
rival of that object.'?" Any earthly good can at best bear only a symbolic relationship to the
eternal good of a transtemporal and transfinite destiny that will one day fully and truly satisfy.
But, as beings incurvatus in se, we seek to satisfy Desire with created things, turning the finite
into the ultimate. This grim aspect of human nature is especially fed by the sense of worldliness
that dominates the spirit of our age. In a sense, Lewis saw Sehnsucht as a tool to break the 'spell'
of worldliness:
Almost our whole education has been directed to silencing this shy, persistent, inner
voice; almost all our modem philosophies have been devised to convince us that the
good of man is to be found on this earth. And yet it is a remarkable thing that such
philosophies of Progress or Creative Evolution themselves bear reluctant witness to
the truth that our real goal is elsewhere. When they want to convince you that earth is
your home, notice how they set about it. They begin by trying to persuade you that
earth can be made into heaven, thus giving a sop to your sense of exile in earth as it
is. Next, they tell you that this fortunate event is still a good way off in the future,
thus giving a sop to your knowledge that the fatherland is not here and now. Finally,
lest your longing for the transtemporal should awake and spoil the whole affair, they
use any rhetoric that comes to hand to keep out of your mind the recollection that
even if all the happiness they promised could come to man on earth, yet still each
29 Ibid., 3.
30 This portion of Lewis' writings may appear to be theologically problematic, as it seems to drift too far




generation would lose it by death, including the last generation of all, and the whole
story would be nothing, not even a story, for ever and ever."
In other words, the first step in the dialectic of Desire is negative rather than positive; one must
first realize that nothing in the world can or will satisfy before they can realize the true object of




The Domestication of Transcendence
In The Domestication of Transcendence, William Placher asserts that since the 17th century
there has been a major shift in our understanding and approach to God. This shift is evident not
only within the life of the church, but has spilled out into the wider culture-in literature, in
philosophy, and in the arts. While pre-modem thinkers such as Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin were
"struck by the mystery, the wholly otherness of God, and the inadequacy of any human
categories as applied to God,"! later figures beginning with Descartes turned to an
anthropocentric view of the world. Placher labels this as the "domestication of transcendence," a
shift away from analogical predication towards univocal and equivocal uses of language. What,
then, is meant by these technical terms? Two things are said univocally if we mean the same
thing in both cases ... two usages are equivocal if they simply happen to use the same word for
completely different meanings," while "analogical predication lies somewhere in between the
other two classes."?
Applied to the topic of this paper, when talking about God, univocal language could be
seen as being utilized by the skeptic who only looks at Christianity according to scientific terms
and rational categories.' For the Christian, who looks both at and along the Christian life,
analogical predication should be used when talking about God, for the being of God transcends
the limits of our language and rational categories (and yet God chooses to reveal himself
1 William Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996),6.
2 Ibid., 28.
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specifically through language, which demonstrates why we necessarily must look both at and
along). Lewis would agree with Placher in saying that those who look at the ultimate things of
life under solely univocal predication have won the day. Because of the anthropocentric shift,
God is not the source oflight by which we must look along and at everything; rather, we set the
terms by stepping outside the beam of light, looking at it, contemplating it, ceasing to enjoy God
and instead putting him in the dock. What is needed is a spell to break the enchantment of
worldliness, to point to something more, to affirm the failure of creation's ability to fulfill the
Desire of us who are created. For C. S. Lewis, the lived dialectic of Desire helped break the spell
of worldliness and gave him a taste for a world filled with wonder, enchantment, and myth.
The Method of Myth4
G. K. Chesterton, in his work Orthodoxy, asserts: "Poetry is sane because it floats easily in
an infinite sea; reason seeks to cross the infinite sea, and so make it finite. The result is mental
exhaustion." Poetry and myth can be seen as belonging to the same literary category, that which
exalts creativity and imagination rather than just rationality. For "the poet only desires exaltation
and expansion, a world to stretch himself in," and "only asks to get his head into the heavens."
Myth lifts us into the heavens and allows us to better understand reality, but "it is the logician
who seeks to get the heavens into his head. And it is head that splits."? Unfortunately, as pointed
out by both Lewis and Placher, our current age since the scientific revolution more accurately
3 Unfortunately, as Placher demonstrates, this often affects the church as well.
4 Because 'myth' has a variety of meanings, a further defmition is necessary. In this paper, myth is used as a
technical term to express the reality of things which are beyond empirical observation. It could also be referred to as
narrative or story. However, it is important to note here that myth and truth are closely connected, for myth does not
arise out of the individual's imagination but rather from an ontology of the Word. In other words, there is one true
Myth, and this Myth became Fact in the incarnation.
5 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Colorado Springs: Random House, 2001), 15.
6 Ibid., 15.
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resembles the logician rather than the poet, and discourages this "gigantesque imagination, which
is, perhaps, the mightiest pleasures of man." This is not to say that logic or scientific inquiry are
useless, but rather, that they must be properly utilized-with humility-for "it is impossible
without humility to enjoy anything--even pride.:" Poets and scientists are both needed, but in
recent years the balance has been upset and is in need of a recovery.
In his essay, What is Myth?, Clyde Kilby provides an excellent account of the nature of
myth. While he maintains that the two most basic characteristics of mankind are to know and to
worship, there exists a third characteristic-the imagination-which is necessary to address the
mythic core of our humanity. He writes:
Our present age in particular is convinced that the main avenue to knowing is the
making of statements. Yet all statements whatever, indeed all systems, in becoming
statements and systems, become self-destructive. One is at sixes and sevens to
translate a language of one hundred thousand words into a language of one thousand
words. This is man's predicament. What man is, what he feels himself to be, makes a
wasteland of language. Yet because of man's insatiable desire to know he requires
some sort of verbal actualization ... We intellectualize in order to know, but
paradoxically, intellectualization tends to destroy its object. The harder we grasp at
the thing, the more its reality moves away. 10
Note the parallels with Lewis who says our dilemma is to taste and not to know or to know and
not to taste. In response to this, imagination is necessary because it is able to transcend systems
and statements: "By some magic, imagination is able to disengage our habitual discursive and
system-making and send us on a journey toward gestures, pictures, images, rhythms, metaphor,
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overly univocal language, imagination and creativity have a way of preserving the whole of
objects through analogical predication, symbol, and gesture. While over-systematizing can
flatten and drain away color and life, myth restores. 12 This is not to promote an overly negative
posture towards intellectualization, but rather to demonstrate the necessary rhythm between
intellectualization and imagination; systems and stories; looking at and looking along-which
has been lacking in our Modem age. Why, then, is this rhythm so fundamentally important?
While theology by definition deals with words, with language, and with statements, these
alone can be unsatisfying due to man's fundamentally mythic nature." According to Kilby: "His
real health depends upon his knowing and living his metaphysical totality. In myth man
discovers and affirms not his disparate nature but his mythic.'?" Knowing and living are both
necessary in order to be fully actualized human beings, but as Wingren said: "to live is
something larger and more important than having knowledge.':" Wingren wrote this in order to
express that in the ancient church, "people had not yet focused their attention on the contrast ...
between having knowledge and not having knowledge.':" Rather, the ancient church saw the
fundamental contrast as being a "contrast of death standing over against life?" One can see this
in the simple act of breathing, for "Breathing is more important than knowledge about
12 Kilby, xi.
13 For instance, words, language, and statements that are merely about God (secondary discourse) are
unsatisfying because of our mythic nature. But the Word is not primarily about God-the Word is living and active
and connects us to our mythic totality. This can be seen in the sacraments and in the Word proclaimed through
which the Spirit actualizes the reality of the human being in fellowship with God.
14K'lb .I y, Xl.




breathing.'?" Far too often Wingren's words have been reversed, and knowing has been seen as
something larger and more important than living.
In the Modem age, the common assumption is that one can explain the workings of the
world through purely scientific means. This directly contrasts pre-Modem civilizations that
created elaborate mythologies to explain natural events. While science can describe that which is
observable, it cannot address our transcendental nature. It relies upon a posteriori rather than a
priori knowledge. It can look at a beam of light but it cannot look along the beam to see its
ultimate source of being. In fact, take away the source of light and science would cease to exist,
for it would have nothing to look at. Myth, on the other hand, as C. S. Lewis states, gets at why
"we want something else which can hardly be put into words-to be united with the beauty we
see, to pass into it, to receive it into ourselves .... "19 This, again, is not to say that scientific
systems and statements are unimportant. Rather, they must be utilized within their proper
boundaries. It is equally dangerous to flee from scientific statements that reflect empirical
observations in favor of imagined anthropocentric mythologies. This again demonstrates that one
must look both along and at everything, for you can only step out of one experience by stepping
into another.
Myth Became Fact
In his essay, Myth Became Fact, C. S. Lewis responds to his friend Corineus who
contended that those who claim to be Christian in the Modem age are in fact not Christian at all.
According to Corineus, "historic Christianity is something so barbarous that no modem man can
18 Ibid., 355.
19 Lewis, The Weight a/Glory, 13.
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really believe it.?" What, then, of the millions that claim to believe it? Corineus would argue that
"the modems who claim to do so are in fact believing a modem system of thought which retains
the vocabulary of Christianity and exploits the emotions inherited from it while quietly dropping
its essential doctrines."?' While it is unfortunately true that there are those who speak the
language of Christianity, using traditional and orthodox signifiers while redefining the signified,
this in no way accounts for all who claim to be Christian. Lewis responds to this asking why
these "pseudo-Christians" hang on to this vestigial vocabulary, why would they "insist on
expressing their deepest thoughts in terms of an archaic mythology which must hamper and
embarrass them at every tum?,,22Would it not be easier to cut the umbilical cord so to say? And
if Corineus was right, this is exactly what they would do. But, as Lewis points out: "They will
strain the cord almost to breaking point, but they refuse to cut it. Sometimes they will take every
step except the last one. »23
While it would be far easier to cut the cord, to drop the 'archaic mythology' upon which
Christianity rests, "it is the myth which is the vital and nourishing element in the whole
concern.':" Lewis quotes Miss Bingley in Pride and Prejudice to illustrate this: "Would not
conversation be much more rational than dancing?" Mr. Bingley responds, "Much more rational,
but much less like a ball.':" While Corineus wants to adjust Christianity with the times, it is the
times that move away. But the myth abides," and "It is the myth that gives life.''" Would not
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'modem' Christianity be more rational than 'archaic' Christianity? Yes, much more rational, but
much less like Christianity.
To further illustrate this, Lewis takes a closer look at myth by incorporating
epistemological categories that resonate with the distinctions of looking at and looking along, as
well as with Alexander's concept of Enjoyment and Contemplation. His argument rests on the
premise that "Human intellect is incurably abstract ... Yet the only realities we experience are
concrete.'?" The young man who was in love and looks along the sexual impulse is experiencing
a concrete reality. But, the moment he looks at the sexual impulse and intellectually apprehends
'love,' he then loses the concrete experience and instead deals with the abstract idea of 'love.' At
this point, "the concrete realities sink to the level of mere instances or examples.'?" So, according
to Lewis: "This is our dilemma-either to taste and not to know or to know and not to taste-or,
more strictly, to lack one kind of knowledge because we are in an experience or to lack another
kind because we are outside it.'?" What, then, is the solution?
In response to the dilemma of tasting and not knowing or knowing and not tasting, Lewis
claims that myth is at least the partial solution, for-"In the enjoyment of a great myth we come
nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood only as an abstraction.'?'
It is important to point out that it is in the enjoyment of myth that this is true and not in the
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This is not to say that we should not contemplate the Lord's Supper, but rather that the contemplation remains an
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when the myth is received and enjoyed as a story, the principle can be experienced concretely,
for-"What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always about
something, but reality is that about which truth is.)?" And here, Lewis ties it all together with the
conclusion-"Now as myth transcends thought, Incarnation transcends myth. The heart of
Christianity is a myth which is also a fact.'?' It is here that worlds collide, and there is "the
marriage of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth and Perfect Fact: claiming not only our love and our
obedience, but also our wonder and delight.':" The fact that there are numerous parallels between
Christianity and pagan mythology does not mean that the Judeo-Christian Scriptures are false
and that we should "be ashamed of the mythical radiance resting on our theology,'?" but rather
that we should offer it an imaginative embrace. For, "God is more than a god, not less; Christ is
more than Balder, not less.''" When one looks along and at the true Myth, the Myth that became
Fact, one is free to look at the wonders and delights of the world in a way that brings glory to the
teach about the sacraments (although there is a place for this), but rather we should do the sacraments. The teaching
about is important and a necessary pre-condition, but it ultimately must lead to participation in-otherwise the
sacraments turn into a lecture instead of a promise.
33 Ibid., 66. Lewis' words at this point need further clarification. When he uses the term truth it appears that he
is referring specifically to secondary discourse, hence truth is about something. When he uses the term reality, he
seems to be getting at that which the truth is about, what Forde would call primary discourse. This distinction can
also be seen in the difference between looking at and looking along. One can look at the truth of something without
experiencing it as a reality. The scientist looked at the young man's experience oflove, and was truthful in saying it
was a matter of the biological stimulus. But the young man, on the other hand, experienced the reality oflove as he
looked along it. Or take the example of breathing, it is more important to experience the reality of breathing than to
know truths about breathing. Both truth and reality have an objective standard and are not determined by the
individual, but it is more beneficial for the individual to experience as a reality than only to have knowledge about
that experience. Better yet is for one to experience as a reality and have knowledge about that reality, to accurately
look both along and at everything. For, reality cannot be experienced outside of truth, they are necessarily







Source of all life. This sets the stage for Lewis' understanding of faithfully enjoying created
things without turning them into ultimate things.
The Dialectic of Enjoyment and Renunciation
As sinful creatures we try to control, manipulate, and repristinate experiences that are
pleasurable (such as Joy or Sehnsucht), but in doing this we inevitably lose the pleasure.
According to Lewis, it is only in living the dialectic of enjoyment and renunciation that
enjoyment is truly possible. In The Taste/or the Other: The Social and Ethical Thought of C. s.
Lewis, Gilbert Meilaender provides an analysis of Lewis' dialectic of enjoyment and
renunciation. While Lewis in his space trilogy offers an imaginative vision of what the proper
posture for unfallen creatures would be toward created things, in the whole of his writings he
deals with the reality of our situation as fallen beings through the Christian story of creation, fall,
incarnation, redemption, and eschaton:" Within this story, the proper attitude toward created
things as fallen creatures must be more than just receptivity. Instead, it involves "a kind of
double attitude toward things-a dialectical movement between enjoyment and renunciation.'?"
Related to the Christian story, creation is full of objects of delight and 'Romantic' experiences,
but these are still created things. Meilaender states that-"They call us out of ourselves, but they
cannot satisfy the heart which seeks in them a full answer to its longing.':" Or in other words,
they serve as signposts that are meant to point toward the Source of life who alone can satisfy
Desire. In the words of Lewis, all pleasures are "shafts of the glory as it strikes our sensibility.':"
These shafts should not be looked at as the glory but along towards the Glory. On the one hand,





we enjoy and delight in objects of beauty in the creation; on the other hand, we renounce them as
being of little consequence when compared to the Creator who transcends the ideal of beauty.
Lewis summarizes this double pattern of enjoyment and renunciation in The Problem oj
Pain:
The settled happiness and security which we all desire, God withholds from us by the
very nature of the world: but joy, pleasure, and merriment He has scattered broadcast.
We are never safe, but we have plenty of fun, and some ecstasy. It is not hard to see
why. The security we crave would teach us to rest our hearts in this world and oppose
an obstacle to our return to God: a few moments of happy love, a landscape, a
symphony, a merry meeting with our friends, a bathe, or a football match, have no
such tendency. Our Father refreshes us on the journey with some pleasant inns, but
will not encourage us to mistake them for horne."
This directly relates to Lewis' experiences with Joy and Sehnsucht. The world was full of objects
of delight that caused him to become overwhelmed with Desire, but when he looked at these
created things or experiences as the source of delight he found them to be empty. Over time he
realized that the Desire was not in them but rather came through them. They must, on the one
hand, be enjoyed with an attitude of thankfulness and receptivity and, on the other hand, be
renounced as being of little consequence compared to the Source of delight. This, however,
brings up an important question that must be addressed: If God is the source of delight, to which
all good created things point, then what of our experiences of pain; would not God then be the
source of all pain? And if God is the source of pain, then how can God be good?
Sehnsucht and Pain
In A Grief Observed, Lewis provides an incredibly open and honest account of his struggle
with grief over the loss of his wife Joy Davidman. While he once saw God as the source of all
Joy and Desire, in the midst of personal and intense pain this perception was brought into
42 c. S. Lewis, The Problem a/Pain (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 103.
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question, for if God is the source of pleasure must he not also be the source of pain? Instead of
then turning to materialism and rejecting the existence of God, Lewis became increasingly afraid
that God was real but not necessarily good: "I am more afraid that we are really rats in a trap. Or,
worse still, rats in a laboratory. Someone said, 1believe, 'God always geometrizes.' Supposing
the truth were 'God always vivisects'?"? Lewis continues, "What reason have we, except our
own desperate wishes, to believe that God is, by any standard we can conceive, 'good'? Doesn't
all the prima face evidence suggest exactly the opposite? What have we to set against it?"44
Notice the abrupt change. Throughout his life Lewis argued that there is an unsatisfied desire in
each of us that nothing in this world can satisfy-only God can fulfill the ultimate longings of
our heart, for he is the Source of all delight and all things good and beautiful. But when faced
with extreme grief and pain, Lewis wondered if God were not a Cosmic Sadist, who "Time after
time, when He seemed most gracious He was really preparing the next torture.'?" Granted, Lewis
admits that these words were more of a 'yell' than a thought. But when examining it from a more
rational point of view, he comes to see that his wife's death did not really introduce anything
new into the universe that he did not already know. He asks:
What grounds has it given me for doubting all that 1believe? 1knew already that
these things, and worse, happened daily. 1would have said that 1had taken them into
account. I had been warned-I had warned myself-not to reckon on worldly
happiness. We were even promised sufferings. They were part of the program. We
were even told, 'Blessed are they that mourn,' and 1accepted it. I've got nothing that
1hadn't bargained for. Of course it is different when the thing happens to oneself, not
to others, and in reality, not in imagination."





Lewis had looked at suffering and pain in the world, and in thinking about them he was able to
get God off the hook by rationalizing that a greater good could come from them. But, when
forced to look along suffering and pain and participate in them in a real and personal way, he
realized that his faith (from his own perspective) had been a house of cards:
The faith which 'took these things into account' was not faith but imagination. The
taking them into account was not real sympathy. If I had really cared, as I thought I
did, about the sorrows of the world, I should not have been so overwhelmed when my
own sorrow came. It has been an imaginary faith playing with innocuous counters
labeled 'Illness,' 'Pain,' 'Death,' and 'Loneliness.' I thought I trusted the rope until it
mattered to me whether it would bear me. Now it matters, and I find I didn't."
What, then, about Lewis' conception of Joy and Sehnsucht? Did Lewis' grief over the death of
his wife cause him to reject the dialectic of Desire that played such a pivotal role in his life?
When put to the test, was Sehnsucht merely a house of cards that had to be knocked down in
order for true faith to take hold? In order to address these rather difficult questions, it will be




A Theological Evaluation of C. S. Lewis' Sehnsucht
Rather than human speculation and desire, God's revelation must be the guiding principle
used to interpret all existence and reality. Here Martin Luther's distinction between the
ministerial and magisterial roles of reason can be helpful. William Lane Craig states that, for
Luther, "In the magisterial use of reason, reason sits over and above the gospel like a magistrate
and judges whether it is true or false.": This contrasts the ministerial use of reason, which
"submits to and serves the gospel as a handmaiden.'? For Luther, it was the Holy Spirit alone
who should serve in the magisterial role, and reason must play the role of a servant. Reason was,
however, a God-given instrument that should be faithfully used and cultivated in service to the
gospel. This same distinction can be applied to human experience.
In the magisterial role of experience, experience frames and forms theological belief and
judges whether it is true or false. Under this role, if theological language conflicts with lived
experience, it is the language that changes. An example of this can be seen in attitudes and
perceptions held towards the exclusivity of the gospel. One might wonder how a loving God
could condemn 'good' people to hell because they hold to a different religion. Theoretically, one
might confess that Jesus is the only way to heaven, but when the implications of this language
confront the real people they love and care for, the magisterial use of experience reframes
I William Lane Craig, Hard Questions, Real Answers (Wheaton: Crossway, 2003), 37.
2 Ibid., 37.
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theological belief in order to make it 'fit' their individual context.' What can result, then, is either
constant fluctuation or fragmentation of belief as it continually changes with the winds of
expenence.
As opposed to this, the ministerial use of experience subordinates experience to God's
revelation in Word and Spirit. Oftentimes, experience is an instrument that defends and supports
that which is believed in faith. An example of this could be seen in C. S. Lewis' Sehnsucht,
where spiritual longing and desire reflects and points outside of itself to the beauty and meaning
of God and his created world. But, to be sure, there are other times when experience challenges
and confronts our faith in God's goodness with the sin and ugliness ofthe world. While under
the magisterial use of experience the language used to express belief then changes; under the
ministerial use of experience, faith is held despite evidence to the contrary. Within this
ministerial use, however, one must be careful to not simply dismiss experience without wrestling
with it and engaging it. For, if theological language does not speak to the realities of human
existence, it runs the risk of turning into an abstract system or theory that fails to hold up to the
weight of the concrete human story.
The question, then, remains as to how this can be further applied to Lewis' Sehnsucht, and
as to whether Lewis' view of Sehnsucht operated according to a ministerial or magisterial use of
experience. Ifhe viewed Sehnsucht primarily through a magisterial use of experience, then it
would be wise to label it as theologically suspect. But, if he approached it according to a
ministerial use of experience, then there could be insights that would further benefit our
theological discourse today by providing a framework in which one can look at the 'Romantic'
3 Rather than an alleged hypothesis, there is growing statistical data that confirms this as a real phenomenon
among the members of many denominations, including the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. See especially the
statistical data gathered by Professor Robert D. Putnam at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University.
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elements in creation and culture while remaining faithful to orthodox boundaries. In order to
further evaluate Lewis' interpretation of Sehnsucht, the work of John Beversluis and Anders
Nygren will be utilized.
The Critics: John Beversluis
In The American Religion: The Emergence of the Post-Christian Nation, Yale professor
Harold Bloom argues that most American worshippers have moved away from traditional
Christianity and instead have embraced pre-Christian Gnostic beliefs.' This Gnostic creed
stresses knowledge of an inner self, which then leads to freedom from the natural world that is
bound by time and decay. While Bloom is sympathetic to such a transition, orthodox Christians
have cause for concern, for Gnosticism and Christianity are in no way compatible. Bloom's
argument traces the American transition to African-American influence in the early 19th century,
and while this may very well have been a factor of the current resurgence, the roots in fact go
back much further. One individual who has attempted to point out the incompatibility of
Christianity and Gnosticism, specifically through his critique of C. S. Lewis, is John Beversluis.'
According to Antony Flew, C. S. Lewis and the Searchfor Rational Religion by John
Beversluis provided "The first systematic and radical critique of C. S. Lewis's theological
arguments.'?" Beversluis' work takes aim at a comment made by C. S. Lewis in his perennial
classic, Mere Christianity: "I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning
4 Harold Bloom, TheAmerican Religion: TheEmergence of ThePost-Christian Nation (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1993).
5 As with Otto's writings, the inclusion of Beversluis' writings should not be seen as an endorsement. While
many of Bevers luis' arguments against Lewis fall short, he does raise important questions that should be further
addressed, specifically regarding the incompatibility of Christianity and Gnosticism.
6 John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search/or Rational Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), front
cover.
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tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it."? After examining Lewis' arguments, he
concludes that they fail." While Beversluis examines a variety of Lewis' arguments, this paper
will focus on his critique of Sehnsucht and the argument/rom desire.
Beversluis begins by citing Romans 1:20, the traditional endorsement of natural theology,
which he cites as being "the attempt by reason unaided by faith to prove the existence of God."?
He goes on to claim that while Lewis thought most of these arguments unsuccessful, he did
accept a few of them, particularly the argument from desire. Now this argument differs from
other apologetic arguments because it rests not on "an excessively abstract and sterile academic
exercise.'?" but rather on "the sensibilities of the religious life by focusing on man's
transcendental longings, on our craving for something that no finite object can ever fully
satisfy.'?' He then correctly points out that this argument in no way originated with Lewis or
with Christianity, but was an instance of natural theology that can be seen since at least the time
of Plato who spoke of "certain recurrent stirrings within the human heart, of a deep and
unquenchable desire that impels the soul to look beyond the world of the senses to a higher realm
where it can find 'true pasture. "'12
Specifically in the Republic and the Symposium, Plato developed an argument that reflected
his Theory of Ideas and the World of Forms. Put simply, the natural world cannot satisfy our
deepest yearnings, for "in all our temporal loves, satisfactions, and goods, we are really desiring
? C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 140.
8 Overall, Beversluis' argument appears to be a straw man, using deductive logic to dismiss Lewis' inductive
method. However, Beversluis' work does raise important questions that are often left ignored.
9 Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, 8.
10 Ibid., 8.
II Ibid., 8.
12 Plato, The Republic, 506. Cf. Symposium, 192,211.
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some more ultimate good of which these earthly attachments provide only an 'inkling.":" In the
footnotes, Beversluis points out that Lewis used the term 'inkling' in Plato's sense, where
"Temporal goods provide a dim but nevertheless genuine glimpse of man's true end.?" The
pagan argument from desire set forth by Plato was then Christianized by St. Augustine as
expressed by his famous statement: "you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until
it rests in yoU."ISAfter living the dialectic of desire and further reflecting upon it, Lewis became
convinced that St. Augustine was right. Any examination of Lewis' argument from desire must
then further examine and expound the Platonic and Augustinian influence. In order to do this, a
brief overview of Platonic origins could prove to be helpful.
Platonic Origins
In the Timaeus, Plato set forth a basic distinction between the physical and eternal worlds
that could be argued as having immeasurable influence upon all Western cosmological thought.
According to Plato, the physical world is a world that changes and perishes, and because of this
it is the object of opinion and unreasoned sensations. As opposed to this, the eternal world never
changes or perishes, and thereby is apprehended by true reason. 16 This could be seen as roughly
paralleling the philosophies of Parmenides and Heraclitus, with Parmenides advocating that all
reality is changeless (eternal world), and Heraclitus claiming that all reality is in a continual state
of flux (physical world). According to Anthony Kenny, "Much of Plato's most energetic
philosophizing was devoted to the task of reconciling, or disarming, these two champions.?"
\3 Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, 8.
14 Ibid., 170.
ISSaint Augustine, Confessions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),3.
16 See Plato, Timaeus, 28a.
17 Anthony Kenny, Ancient Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 205.
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Plato would assert that since nothing comes into being or changes without cause, the
natural world must have been created by a demiurge (god) that looked to the unchanging and
eternal world of Forms. In this model, the demiurge (god) did not speak the world into existence
ex nihilo, but rather looked to the eternal world of Forms as the archetype." While Plato saw the
demiurge as basically good and free from envy or selfishness, 19 the Gnostics transformed this
demiurge into an evil and fallen god who created an evil and fallen universe. This, then, led to a
body-soul dualism that saw the material creation and physical body as bad, and the eternal world
and immaterial soul as good. How, then, does this relate to Christianity?
Since the time of Jesus, it can be argued that Christianity has been in conflict with body-
soul dualism, and unfortunately, these Gnostic elements have often spilled into it. As Beversluis
points out, St. Augustine 'Christianized' many pagan elements found in Platonic and Hellenistic
thought. A former Manichean-Gnostic, he struggled with the tension between body-soul dualism,
and at times remained overly influenced by its emphasis of soul over body and spirit over
matter." As St. Augustine was influenced by Manichaean-Gnosticism, so has the church been
influenced by St. Augustine," including C. S. Lewis. Beversluis' insists that Hellenistic and
Platonic systems are incompatible with orthodox Christianity. However, these Platonic
influences seem to appear throughout Lewis' writings while remaining under the radar, for very
18 Under this model the term 'demiurge' is more helpful than 'God.' Following Anselm's defmition of 'God'
set forth in the Ontological Argument, Plato would see the 'Forms' as 'God' and not the 'demiurge'.
19 This interpretation of Plato's cosmology in the Timaeus was influenced by the work of Anthony Kenny in
Ancient Philosophy.
20 This is not to say that St. Augustine was not an orthodox theologian, but rather to express the reality of the
tension between our lived experiences and our theological beliefs.
21 To be sure, St. Augustine's vast influence should be honored and appreciated, and when he appears to be
mistaken, our first response should be to ask what he got (in his interpretation of scripture) that we seem to be
missing. To demonstrate the vast influence of Augustine, Anthony Kenny says: "Of all the philosophers in the
ancient world, only Aristotle had a greater influence on human thought." Ancient Philosophy, 115.
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few Christian treatments of Lewis' work seem to point out the Platonic thread." An exception to
this is N. T. Wright, the Bishop of Durham.
In an article published in Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity, N. T. Wright reflects
upon the legacy of C. S. Lewis sixty years after his death. His assessment effectively
demonstrates the delicate balance one should use in approaching Lewis' writings-namely being
able to praise the man and his vast influence while still critically examining those portions that
seem to be theologically problematic. For Wright, the most troubling aspect of Lewis' work was
his implicit Platonism, and apart from Beversluis," he is one of the few individuals to point this
out. He writes:
I fmd Lewis frustratingly fuzzy on heaven and immortality. He clearly believes in the
bodily resurrection and the essential materiality of the ultimate future world, but-
quite apart from the astonishing fact that in talking about Jesus he never in this book
mentions his Resurrection-he persistently refers to "Heaven" in ways that go, to my
mind, far too far towards Plato. He frequently draws back from this, insisting for
instance on the importance of sacraments because God made the material world and
likes it, but I'm not sure he has fully integrated his positive view of the material
creation into his assumed view of heaven. He tells us that if we aim at heaven we'll
get earth thrown in, and this is not only true but appealing; but he never indicates how
this works out, never engages with the New Testament's picture of the new heavens
and new earth which ultimately make sense of the whole thing. Thus he can say, in a
moving but I think deeply misleading passage, that "the anaesthetic fog which we call
'nature' or 'the real world' [will] fade away"; I regard this as a substantial hostage to
Platonic fortune. This problem emerges particularly in his repeated insistence that all
human beings have an immortal soul, which is the "real" part of them, and which is to
be one day either a creature of loathing and horror or one we might be tempted to
worship. I simply don't think this is either biblical or helpful, and I fear that those
who read Lewis will at this point have their traditional expectations of a kind of
Christianity-and-Plato reinforced where they should have them undermined."
22 The cause of this 'avoidance' can be debated. Because of Lewis' vast influence on many Christians
(including myself), there can be a tendency to defend him on a more personal level rather than fully examining the
theological implications of his work. As with St. Augustine, Lewis' writings must be subordinated to scripture, but
we should first ask if he was seeing something that we seem to be missing in our interpretation of scripture.
23 While Beversluis points this out, he tends to go too far and throw the baby out with the bathwater. Because
of this, many Lewis admirers are turned off by his method and approach, perhaps rightfully so.
24 N. T. Wright, "Simply Lewis," Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity 20 (March 2007): 31.
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According to Wright and Beversluis, the Christianity-and-Plato stream must be
eradicated rather than reinforced, for Hellenistic and Platonic systems are incompatible with
Christianity. But did Lewis truly attempt a synthesis between Hellenism and Christianity? At
times, as pointed out by Beversluis and N. T. Wright, Lewis' writings did appear to tend too
much toward Platonism. However, this does not mean his work should be dismissed, for while he
did at times tend toward Platonism, he also offered distinct perspectives and correctives for these
errors that could directly combat the Christianity-and-Plato synthesis.
After pointing out the Platonic influence in Lewis' work, Beversluis goes on to critique the
Augustinian framework of love and desire through his critique of Lewis' argumentfrom desire,
pointing out that it is an attempted synthesis of Platonic and Christian thought which are by
nature incompatible. He states:
The Christian gospel has as its purpose neither the satisfaction nor the setting in
motion of man's natural desire for happiness. Its purpose is to persuade men to repent
of their sins, and it does not look upon sin as the result of an unavoidable and
regrettable ignorance. In setting forth the view that man is intended for fellowship
with God the biblical writers did not see themselves as merely underwriting a thesis
that Greek philosophy had established on its own centuries ago. Nor does the biblical
view picture human beings as desiring and groping for some good of which they have
a dim awareness or "inkling"; it pictures them as at odds with God and in flight from
him. We are fallen creatures whose relation to God is defined in terms of enmity, not
aspiration."
Elsewhere he states:
The Platonic view knows nothing of the radical evil in man insisted upon by
Christianity; it accounts for his pursuit of false objects by claiming that he is ignorant.
The biblical view, on the other hand, knows nothing of the Platonic notion of desire;
it accounts for man's pursuit of false objects by claiming that he deliberately and
knowingly disobeys God. If our desire for God were really as strong and
systematically operative as the Platonic view suggests, we could not be as wicked as
the Bible claims we are. On the other hand, if we really are that wicked, our desire for
God could not be as strong as the Platonic view claims it is. To say, with Lewis, that
25 Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search/or Rational Religion, 24-25.
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we desire God in his attractiveness but flee from his severe side is to give birth to a
philosophical hybrid, a conceptual mongrel that lacks the authentic pedigree of either
parent."
Regarding the incompatibility between Christianity and Platonic thought, Beversluis'
argument succeeds in demonstrating certain differences between the twO.27 The Biblical writers
did not see themselves as underwriting an already established philosophical or religious system,
nor did they view human beings as being primarily ignorant rather than sinful. It is also true that
we are fallen creatures whose relationship with God apart from Christ is defined in terms of
enmity, not of aspiration. But, as Harold Bloom demonstrated, most American worshipers are
abandoning these traditional tenets of the Christian faith in favor of a form of Gnosticism.
Because of this Gnosticism-and-Christianity synthesis, it is often difficult to faithfully
distinguish between the two camps, for their differences tend to fly under the radar within a
cloud of their seeming similarities."
While Beversluis does effectively demonstrate some of the dangers of Platonic and Gnostic
influence upon Christianity, his analysis falls short on two accounts. First, his understanding of
the Christian gospel is rather narrow and reflects the over-systematization of theological
language. When he says that the purpose of the Christian gospel is "to persuade men to repent of
their sins.'?" he assumes that this is the only correct 'angle' to view God's one work of
reconciliation. While repentance is necessary, it is neither the end of the Christian gospel nor its
fullest expression. Beversluis appears to fall into the strict dialectic framework of justification
26 Ibid., 22.
27 While he succeeds in demonstrating the differences, he fails to point out ifthere are any similarities, and in
doing so his analysis appears to be rather one-sided.
28 While these differences are subtle, the implications of these differences have overwhelming implications and
consequences. See especially N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the
Mission of the Church (New York: HarperOne, 2008).
29 Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search/or Rational Religion, 24.
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that fails to leave room for either our created nature or a linear framework of sanctification. A
second way that Beversluis' argument is problematic is that he tends to misrepresent Lewis'
position by approaching it in vacuo?" By failing to adequately represent either the Christian
gospel or Lewis' position, Beversluis effectively disarms a straw man with a straw man, leaving
the real work of Lewis to be reckoned with.
The Critics: Anders Nygren
In his seminal work, Agape and Eros, Anders Nygren provides an exhaustive account of
the idea of love through the fundamental motifs of Agape and Eros. While the methods of his
motif-research have been debated, his sweeping historical assessment of the Eros and Agape
themes are invaluable. According to Nygren, the uniquely Christian concept of Agape is "the
transvaluation of all ancient values,'?' but throughout history it has inevitably reassumed a
certain measure of those values. The primary culprit of distorting the fundamental nature of
Agape, according to Nygren, is the Eros motif. While some see Agape as the sublimation of Eros
(possibly Lewis?), Nygren sees Agape and Eros as two distinct and separate streams with no
possibility for synthesis or convergence:
The mistake is commonly made of representing Agape as a higher and more
spiritualised form of Eros, and of supposing that the sublimation of Eros is the way to
reach Agape. The thought of "the heavenly Eros" reminds us that that is not the case;
for heavenly Eros may be a sublimation of sensual love, but it is not itself capable of
further sublimation. The heavenly Eros is the highest possible thing of its kind; it has
been spiritualised to an extent beyond which it is impossible to go. Agape stands
alongside, not above, the heavenly Eros; the difference between them is not one of
30 For instance, Beversluis fails to take into account Lewis' imaginative works, which were an important part
of his overall thought. For more on this, see chapter 22 in Gilbert Meilaender, Things that Count: Essays Moral and
Theological (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2000).
31 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 30
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degree but of kind. There is no way, not even that of sublimation, which leads over
from Eros to Agape."
Dietrich Bonhoeffer echoes this sentiment in Life Together, saying: "Human love [Eros] can
never understand spiritual love [Agape], for spiritual love is from above; it is something
completely strange, new, and incomprehensible to all earthly love.?"
While Eros can provide an account for man's love for God, in whom one can find their
summum bonum and ultimate happiness, it cannot provide an account for God's love for man,
which is indifferent in value. As Luther states in Thesis 28 of the Heidelberg Disputation: "The
love of God does not find, but creates, that which is pleasing to it. The love of man comes into
being through that which is pleasing to it.'?' While man's love is by nature acquisitive, God's
love is by nature kenotic. While man loves as a means to an end, for God self-giving love is
means and end. While the Apostle Paul held to the uniquely Christian and kenotic nature of
Agape, the acquisitive nature of Eros gradually began to spill over from the beginning of the
early church." This spill over can be seen in the work of St. Augustine, who in turn heavily
influenced C. S. Lewis (as well as the church at large).
Augustine saw all love as acquisitive love. For him, "To love means to direct one's
longing and desire to an object by the possession of which one expects to be made happy.'?" Man
by nature wants to be happy, but man inevitably looks for happiness in the wrong places. Only
Christianity can fulfill the natural desire for happiness, but not everyone recognizes this. Hence,
32 Ibid., 52.
33 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together (New York: HarperCol\ins, 1954),35.
34 Martin Luther, Heidelberg Disputation, quoted in Gerhard Forde, On Being a Theologian of the Cross
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997),21.
35 Nygren asserts that the uniquely Christian concept of Agape was largely missing from the history of the
church until the Reformation when Luther restored it. The extent of his interpretation can be debated.
36 Nygren, Agape and Eros, 476
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"in aiming at your own happiness, you are unwittingly reaching out towards Christianity.'?" Love
and the desire for happiness are intimately connected and serve as the defining mark of what it
means to be human. From this human perspective, our whole life exists in "a ceaseless pursuit of
advantages.':" In the words of Nygren:
When Augustine takes desire and the longing which is centred in the self and its
interests, as the chief marks of all human life, even of the highest, he intends no
disparagement of humanity; it is simply a way of saying that we, unlike God, have
not life in ourselves and of ourselves, but from Him. Desire is the mark of the
creature; it is grounded in God's own will and plan."
Desire is not, however, the mark of the Creator, for "God alone is the Immortal who has life in
Himself; therefore He needs nothing that is outside Himself. God has His 'bonum' in Himself,
and that is why there cannot be found in Him any need or desire.'?" Within this theological
framework, men in their sinning are in actuality searching for a god (albeit in the wrong places)
who provides identity, security, and meaning. This is accurately reflected in the words ascribed
to G. K. Chesterton: "A man knocking on the door of a brothel is knocking for God."41A
possible critique of this framework is that appears to be heavily egocentric rather than
theocentric in nature. It could be seen as replacing God with the idol of an ideal in a way that
uses God as a means to an end (desiring God's things instead of God himself). How, then, does
this interact with the writings of C. S. Lewis?
Most likely, Anders Nygren would claim that C. S. Lewis' writings are merely another
version of the Eros motif, and because of this should be seen as theologically suspect. There are,






work should be fully dismissed. While Nygren effectively critiques the Eros motif as a ladder to
climb to God, he appears to fail to provide a proper place for it to function within our created
nature or the linear framework of sanctification. This, then, appears to lead to an over-
systematization of theological language where justification is the only 'angle' to view God's one
work of reconciliation. In other words, the Eros motif viewed through a 2nd article lens should
most definitely be identified and eradicated, but through the lens of the I st article Eros exists as a
reality reflecting the nature of our humanity, and through the lens of the 3rd article God's Agape
can be seen as transforming our Eros by directing our desire to its proper object-to God
himself. Again, the Eros motif must not serve as a prescription for how one comes into
fellowship with God,42but it can serve as a description reflecting the reality of our human
situation and Christian journey. As Lewis wrote, "If there lurks in most modem minds the notion
that to desire our own good and earnestly to hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad thing, I submit
that this notion has crept in from Kant and the Stoics and is not part of the Christian faith."?
What, then, does this mean for the theological task?
The proper theological boundaries must firmly oppose any egocentric systems that attempt
to climb the ladder to God, but in doing so they must leave room for humans to be human and for
Christians to be transformed by God towards holiness. Desire is a mark of our humanity. Desire
is not, by itself, good or bad, but is dependent upon that which it is directed towards. The
pertinent question is whether our desire is directed towards God or towards self. This could and
should lead one to believe that desire, as an experience, must be viewed according to a
ministerial use of experience which serves God's one reconciling work in Christ. When this
41 The exact origin of this quote is unknown.
42As the Gnosticism-Christianity synthesis would maintain.
43 C. S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory, 1.
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happens, one is free to look along the 'Romantic' elements in creation and culture, such as
Sehnsucht, while remaining faithful to orthodox theological boundaries. Human experience,
including Desire (as expressed in the work ofSt. Augustine and C. S. Lewis), can be seen as a




Lewis' Ministerial View of Sehnsucht
If Lewis interpreted Sehnsucht according to a magisterial and egocentric use of experience,
then his understanding of Sehnsucht should be viewed as theologically suspect. But, if he
interpreted Sehnsucht according to a ministerial and theocentric use, then his insights could very
well serve to bridge the at times fragmented gap between theological language and the reality of
lived experience. While through the writings of John Beversluis and Anders Nygren we have
seen some of the implicit dangers in the Platonic and Gnostic threads of the Eros motif when
applied to the 'angle' of justification, it remains to be seen whether Lewis himself operated
according to this Eros motif. According to Beversluis, the answer would most definitely be yes,
but he tends to base his argument upon a straw man in order to attack a straw man. According to
Nygren, the answer would most likely be yes, and between the two (Beversluis and Nygren),
Nygren's analysis should be given far more weight. But both of these conclusions seem to rely
too much, if not exclusively, upon the 2nd article 'angle' of justification. While Lewis' writings
did at times ring of Platonism, 1 these instances seem to be limited to the' angles' of our created
1 Much of this is most likely due to the strong influence Platonism had upon Lewis in his early years. This
influence can be seen in a letter written in 1930 before he converted to Christianity regarding an experience he had
of' Joy': "To-day I got such a sudden intense feeling of delight that it sort of stopped me in my walk and spun me
round. Indeed the sweetness was so great, & seemed so to affect the whole body as well as the mind, that it gave me
pause-it was so very like sex. One knows what a psychoanalyst would say-it is sublimated lust, a kind of defeated
masturbation which fancy gives one to compensate for external chastity. Yet after all, why should that be the right
way oflooking at it? Ifhe can say that It is sublimated sex, why is it not open to me to say that sex is undeveloped
It?-as Plato would have said. And if as Plato thought, the material world is a copy or mirror of the spiritual, then
the central feature of the material life (=sex), must be a copy of something in the Spirit: and when you get a faint
glimpse of the latter, of course you find it like the former: an Original is like its copy: a man is like his portrait. ..
However, one cannot be too careful: one must try to hold fast to ones duties (I wish I did) which are the prose of the
spiritual life and not learn to depend too much on these delightful moments." C. S. Lewis, The Collected Letters of
C. S. Lewis (3 vols; New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 1:877-88.
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nature and the linear journey of sanctification. While this could very well still be theologically
problematic, Lewis also made unique contributions that served to undermine Platonic and
Gnostic influences when they were in conflict with Christianity. This is especially evident when
one traces Lewis' spiritual and intellectual development throughout the whole of his life.
What, Now, of Joy?
While Lewis claimed that in a sense' Joy' served as the central story of his life, after his
conversion to Christianity he increasingly downplayed its importance, both in his own life and in
the life ofthe fellow believer. At the end of his spiritual autobiography, Surprised by Joy, when
asked-"What now of' Joy'?"-Lewis responded:
To tell you the truth, the subject has lost nearly all interest for me since I became a
Christian .... I believe that the old stab, the old bittersweet, has come to me as often
and as sharply since my conversion as at any time of my life whatever. But I now
know that the experience, considered as a state of my own mind, had never had the
kind of importance I once gave it. It was valuable only as a pointer to something
other and outer.'
These few sentences serve as the key to understanding Lewis' interpretation of Sehnsucht. After
spending the bulk of his spiritual autobiography tracing the influence of Joy, he concludes by
saying that "the subject has lost nearly all interest for me since I became a Christian."? The
experience of Sehnsucht is ultimately valuable only in its ability to point to something outside of
itself, but one is only capable of coming to this realization through the lens of faith," One would
expect, then, that Lewis' preoccupation with Joy would diminish in his later writings, but on
further investigation this does not seem to be the case.
2 Lewis, Surprised By Joy, 238.
3 Ibid., 238.
4 Without faith, Sehnsucht would be more desirable than any other satisfaction, thus becoming an idol.
Through the lens of faith, one is able to see that Sehnsucht is not the object of desire, for the ultimate object of our
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In Lewis' later writings, despite dismissing the importance of Joy after his conversion to
Christianity, he continued to refer to it as a repeating theme. For instance, in Mere Christianity,
arguably his most famous apologetic book, the argument of desire is clearly expressed through
his writings on 'hope.' In his well-known sermon, The Weight of Glory, Lewis appeals to the
experience of Sehnsucht as pointing to our eternal destiny of glory. In The Problem of Pain, the
chapter on heaven upholds the seemingly Eros motif of Desire. By examining these different
positions, it appears that Lewis lived a contradiction. On the one hand, he said that the subject of
Joy had lost nearly all interest for him since he became a Christian; on the other hand, most of
his Christian writings were full of the subject of Joy. Rather than being accidental, the apparent
contradictory treatments of Sehnsucht could be seen as intentional as they reflect Lewis' given
purpose and point.
Lewis' Apologetic Method
In Rejoinder to Dr Pittenger, Lewis responds to the remarks made by Dr. Pittenger in the
article 'A Critique ofC. S. Lewis' which appeared in Christian Century. According to Lewis, the
weakness in Pittenger's critical method was that he judged Lewis' books in vacuo--"with no
consideration of the audience to whom they were addressed or the prevalent errors they were
trying to combat." This demonstrates the danger of strictly looking at an author's work without
taking into account the wider context ofthe author's purpose and point." This also seems to be
the very mistake that John Beversluis tended towards in his assessment of Lewis' writings. Who,
desire, as st. Augustine demonstrated, is God himself.
5 C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock, 182.
6 The task of writing necessarily involves both looking along and looking at. An author looks along an
experience or thought, and then must look at that experience or thought in order to communicate it in language. The
critic must be careful to not dismiss an author's work solely by looking at, for the critic must share a frame of
reference with the author by at one time also looking along the experience or thought. For the most part, if the critic
has never looked along the experience or thought, it is questionable whether he is capable of effectively looking at
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then, was the audience that Lewis was addressing and what prevalent errors was he trying to
combat regarding his writings on Sehnsucht?
Lewis saw most of his books as being evangelistic and "addressed to tous exo?" Because of
this, he maintained that "It would have been inept to preach forgiveness and a Saviour to those
who did not know they were in need of either.?" Or put another way, it would have been futile to
proclaim a sovereign God who ruled over and above the universe to those who believed that
nothing existed over and above the universe. In light ofthis, Lewis' inclusion of Joy and
Sehnsucht in his evangelistic writings can be seen as an apologetic tool that is meant to break the
spell of worldliness and awaken a sense of need for something other and outer." In a letter
composed in 1954, Lewis writes: "All joy (as distinct from mere pleasure, still more amusement)
emphasizes our pilgrim status: always reminds, beckons, awakes desire. Our best havings are
wantings.''" This pilgrim status contrasted the Modem view of a permanent status, where the
world was seen as being all there is, all there was, and all there ever will be. How, then, did
Lewis address a distinctively Modem audience?
Lewis believed that the Modem age was dominated by a this-worldly materialism which




9 It is important here to distinguish between apologetics and preaching. C. S. Lewis did not see himself as a
preacher, he saw himself as an apologist. An apologist can be seen as operating more according to anthropological
categories; this should not be true of a preacher (although this is unfortunately often times the case). William
Willimon writes regarding the task of preaching: "We are to be 'God people,' those who 'interject Jesus into the
conversation' in a world that would rather think in exclusively anthropological categories. To be a preacher is to be
trained to talk about what God wants to talk about and to talk in the way that God talks (i.e., Scripture)." William
Willimon, "Pastors Who Won't Be Preachers: A Polemic Against Homiletical Accommodation to the Culture of
Contentment," Journal/or Preachers 29:4 (2006): 40, quoted in David J. Peter, "Reaching Out Without Losing
Balance: Maintaining a Theological Center of Gravity in Preaching," Concordia Journal 35 (2009): 274.
10 C. S. Lewis, The Collected Letters of C. s. Lewis (3 vols; New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 3:523.
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knowledge was somehow superior to looking along. In order to combat this, he sought to awaken
a desire for otherworldly transcendence which served to validate a place at the table for those
who see the need to look both at and along everything. II This was not meant to diminish the
importance of science or logic, but rather to round it out and color it with the mystery and
wonder of God's created order. In doing this, he did at times use Platonic arguments which
resemble the Eros motif, but these arguments were primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive
in nature as they reflected the reality of our created nature and linear journey of sanctification.
How can this be seen?
Instead of being completely antagonistic, there are certain shared characteristics between
Platonism and Christianity regarding their ontological description of the world. For instance,
both believe that there is more to this world than that which meets the eye-some sort of
spiritual reality along with the physical reality we touch and feel. Both also believe that there is
something wrong with the world as we know it, and that the individual is in need of something
more to repair this wrong. At times, Lewis used these shared ontological characteristics between
Platonism and Christianity in order to engage an increasingly materialistic and worldly audience.
This served to demonstrate that there is something more to reality than reason and rationalism
can fully apprehend. However, the parallels between Platonism and Christianity stop at these
broad abstractions (and even these abstractions are far from being identical)." To use theological
language, Platonism can function as the law saying, "there is more to this life and you are
separated from this' rnore," but it can do nothing to bridge this gap to 'moreness'. To clarify,
II It would be interesting to conduct a historical study that examined the role of creative arts within Modern
Western societies. Could the rise of Modern Industrialism have served to marginalize the role of the arts and other
creative expressions?
12 To clarify, these parallels exist only as broad and abstract principles. This does not mean that Platonism and
Christianity are in any way identical, even at the level of abstraction, but rather that there are certain shared (albeit
very few) characteristics.
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Platonism and Gnosticism do offer false alternatives to bridge this gap, but they all fall short.
Lewis appealed to the descriptive nature of Plato's ontological arguments, but he stopped short
of appealing to the prescriptive alternative of Plato's metaphysical arguments. How is this further
evidenced in Lewis' work?
Lewis believed Sehnsucht was an experience common to man that reflected the reality of
our status as human beings, whose ultimate desires can only be satisfied by God. Rather than
awakening sin, this common experience awakens desire for something that can never quite be
fully grasped in our current spatio-temporal state of existence. While the attempt to satisfy this
desire according to egocentric terms would inevitably lead to a form of caritas idealism." Lewis
does not claim that Sehnsucht by itself leads directly to faith. If he did, then it would appear that
he was operating according to the Eros motif as the prescriptive means of the 'angle' of
justification. Rather, Lewis claims:
Thus we must admit that Faith, as we know it, does not flow from philosophical
argument alone; nor from experience of the Numinous alone; nor from the moral
experience alone; nor from history alone; but from historical events which at once
fulfill and transcend the moral category, which link themselves with the most
numinous elements in Paganism, and which (as it seems to us) demand as their pre-
supposition the existence of a Being who is more, but not less, than the God whom
many reputable philosophers think they can establish. 14
Relating this to the specific experience of Sehnsucht and the numinous, Lewis would say that
"until religion comes and retrospectively transforms it, it usually appears to the subject to be a
special form of aesthetic experience." In other words, Sehnsucht is an experience that is common
to humanity, but it cannot work faith or fellowship with God. But, when one is brought into
13 See chapter one in Regin Prenter, Spiritus Creator, trans. John M. Jensen (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press,
1953).
14 Lewis, God in the Dock, 175.
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fellowship with God, faith serves as the lens through which we interpret this experience. 15 In the
Problem of Pain, Lewis is clear on this point saying: "I am not, of course, suggesting that these
immortal longings which we have from the Creator because we are men, should be confused
with the gifts of the Holy Spirit to those who are in Christ. We must not fancy we are holy
because we are human.'?" While it does not lead directly to faith, Sehnsucht can be used as an
attempt to help people identify with a common experience that awakens need. Lewis was not
living a contradiction when he dismissed the importance of Joy in his own life yet gave it such
prominence in his writings; rather, he used that which is common to man as an apologetic tool
that points toward the reality of God. At this point it will be helpful to further examine C. S.
Lewis' apologetic method.
When explaining his role as an apologist, Lewis writes:
My task was therefore simply that of a translator--one turning Christian doctrine, or
what he believed to be such, into the vernacular, into language that unscholarly
people would attend to and could understand ... I may have made theological errors.
My manner may have been defective. Others may do better hereafter. I am ready, if!
am young enough, to learn ... One thing at least is sure. If the real theologians had
tackled this laborious work of translation about a hundred years ago, when they began
to lose touch with the people (for whom Christ died), there would have been no place
for me."
While some critiqued Lewis' method as being vulgar, Lewis responded:
But let all that pass. Suppose the image is vulgar. If it gets across to the unbeliever
what the unbeliever desperately needs to know, the vulgarity must be endured.
Indeed, the image's very vulgarity may be an advantage; for there is much sense in
the reasons advanced by Aquinas (following Pseudo-Dionysius) for preferring to
15 Martin Luther expressed this when using the categories of the hidden and revealed God: "If you believe in
the revealed God and accept his Word, he will gradually also reveal the hidden God, for "he who sees me also sees
the Father," as John 14:9 says. He who rejects the Son also loses the unrevealed God along with the revealed God.
But if you cling to the revealed God with a firm faith, so that your heart is so minded that you will not lose Christ
even if you are deprived of everything, then you are most assuredly predestined, and you will understand the hidden
God." (WA 43:460, 26-35; LW 5:46)
16 Lewis, The Problem a/Pain, 135.
17 C. S. Lewis, God in the Dock, 183.
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present divine truths sub figures vilium corporum [under the figures of vile bodies]
(Summa Theologica, Qu. I,Art. 9 ad tertium). 18
For Lewis, as for Wingren, living is something larger and more important than having
knowledge. Lewis readily admits the possible shortcomings of his theology, but he is primarily
driven by the concrete need of the unbeliever who is spiritually dead and in need of a savior.
While this demonstrates Lewis' apologetic method, what then of the application of Lewis'
concept of Sehnsucht to the life of the believer? Is Sehnsucht only helpful as an apologetic tool
for unbelievers, or can it faithfully playa role in the linear journey of sanctification within the
Christian life?
Sehnsucht Within the Christian Life
C. S. Lewis viewed his experiences of Sehnsucht according to a framework that is best
expressed in terms of relationship. This relational framework is clearly demonstrated in his
Letters. Lewis writes regarding Sehnsucht:
The delights of those days were given to lure us into the world of the Spirit, as sexual
rapture is there to lead to offspring and family life. They were nuptial ardours. To ask
that they should return, or should remain is like wishing to prolong the honeymoon at
an age when a man should rather be interested in the careers of his growing sons.
They have done their work, those days and led on to better things. 19
These few lines effectively demonstrate the role Sehnsucht can play in the life of the believer
while remaining faithful to orthodox theological boundaries. In the early days of the faith
journey Sehnsucht may appear to be of immense importance. But, as one grows and matures the
obsession with 'Romantic' experiences should be replaced with an outward focus of love and
service for others. Jean Varnier expresses this well in his work Community and Growth, saying:
18 Ibid., 182.
19 c. S. Lewis, The Collected Letters ole. s. Lewis, 1:974.
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"People enter community to be happy. They stay to make others happy. 1120 This can also be seen,
as Lewis expresses, in a romantic relationship between a man and woman.
Youth is often marked by an excessive amount of hormones and sexual drive. A
magisterial view of experience (if it feels good do it), would say that since this is a natural desire,
individuals should feel free to gratify this desire freely. Once sexual desire is gone, there is no
reason to stay in a romantic relationship that is only ruled by acquisitive love. This path promises
happiness, but proves to be empty and meaningless. A ministerial view of experience, shaped by
faith, acknowledges the reality of the sexual drive but places it within the wider context of the
Christian narrative. Sexual desire is good, but it must be gratified within the proper boundaries,
that being the covenant of marriage. Once married, the covenant exists to help preserve love and
desire within its proper boundaries. If desire starts to languish, the covenant remains in order to
preserve the relationship. It is the permanence of the covenant that frees us from our egocentric
and selfish tendencies. Through the years, as the relationship matures, the man and woman
within marriage should focus more on each others happiness, not their own desires (although this
should not be disinterested, for love seeks to enjoy its object). The couple entered marriage to be
happy; they stay in marriage to make each other happy, and in doing so fulfill each other's
happiness.
The infancy of an individual's spiritual journey is often marked by 'Romantic'
experiences and powerful emotions. A magisterial view of experience (ruled by emotion) would
set this season up as the norm and standard for the Christian life. When the powerful emotions
become absent, the magisterial view says that there is either something wrong with the
individual's relationship with God, or God must be absent. The ministerial view of experience,
20 Jean Vamier, Community and Growth (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1979),36.
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shaped by faith, acknowledges the reality of 'Romantic' experiences and powerful emotions but
places them within the wider context of the Christian narrative. Experience and emotion are
good, but they must be placed within the proper boundaries of the baptismal covenant. Once
baptized, God's Word defines the relationship, not experience or emotion. When 'Romantic'
experiences or powerful emotions are absent, the certainty of God's Word and promise remain.
Our relationship with God is a divine reality that comes to us extra nos, not a spiritual ideal
which we must realize. It is the permanence of the baptismal covenant that frees us from our
egocentric and selfish tendencies, providing the proper boundaries so that we can grow in our
love and desire for God. Through the years, as faith matures, a believer increasingly focuses not
on experience or emotion but upon love and service." This freedom of 'outwardness' exists only
because the Christian's identity is firmly rooted and established in the person and work of Christ.
And precisely because of this new identity, the original desire (which was marked by experience
and emotion) is increasingly transformed by God in his one reconciling work as it is directed
towards its proper object (God himself, not God's 'things'). How, then, can this relational view
of Sehnsucht be seen through a specifically Lutheran theological lens?
Sehnsucht Within Lutheran Discourse
When looking at Sehnsucht through a Lutheran lens, it could be tempting to dismiss it as
theologically suspect and as another example of the Christianity-and-Plato strand of Eros religion
that needs to be rejected rather than reinforced. However, this runs the risk of over-systematizing
our theological language under solely the 'angle' of justification, which can in turn fail to leave
21 The emphasis upon love and service can be seen throughout Lewis' writings concerning Sehnsucht. Towards
the end of The Weight of Glory, Lewis writes (p. 14): "It may be possible for each to think too much of his own
potential glory hereafter; it is hardly possible for him to think too often or too deeply about that of his neighbour.
The load, or weight, or burden of my neighbour's glory should be laid daily on my back, a load so heavy that only
humility can carry it, and the backs of the proud will be broken."
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room for our created nature and the reality of sanctification which all demonstrate God's one
reconciling work in Christ. When this happens, the theological system can be maintained, but
most likely by compartmentalizing it apart from an individual's lived experiences. Because of
this, we should seek to not only view reality according to a 2nd article dialectic lens, but also
according to the whole of the Christian story as expressed in the narrative of the 1S\ 2nd, and 3rd
articles. This approach could be seen as unifying rather than fragmenting language and
experience, for the angles of creation, justification, and sanctification all reflect God's one work
of reconciling the world to himself in Christ.
It might be argued, however, that this could serve to dilute the integrity of justification as
the article upon which the church stands or falls. But this again demonstrates the over-
systematization ofthe dialectic framework, which can focus too much upon individual salvation
and in turn fail to leave room for the reality of creation and sanctification. Oswald Bayer
addresses this error in his comments entitled "Theses on the Doctrine of Justification," saying:
"The Lutheran understanding of justification can appear to concentrate too much, if not
exclusively, on the personal salvation of the individual. "22 If justification is indeed the article
upon which the church stands or falls, then it needs to encompass not only the salvation of the
individual, but also the entire meta-narrative and myth ofthe 1S\ 2nd, and 3rd articles which
reflect God's one reconciling work. Or, as Bayer writes, "Justification is an event which should
be perceived in its social and universal breadth as well as in its existential depth.'?' Our
theological language must not simply dismiss experience, but rather it must acknowledge the
reality of experience (which marks our humanness), while placing it within the proper
parameters of God's revelation. Neither language nor experience should sit on the magisterial
22 Oswald Bayer, "Theses on the Doctrine of Justification," Lutheran Quarterly XXII (Spring 2008): 72.
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throne, for both are to function ministerially as a handmaiden in service to the gospel. When this
is done, one is free to look both at and along the' Romantic' elements of human experience in
creation and culture while remaining faithful to orthodox boundaries.
No Beauty We Could Desire
C. S. Lewis' spiritual journey was marked by a gradual progression from the abstract to the
concrete, from Platonic speculation to Christian revelation. He demonstrates this gradual
progression by writing of his conversion to Christianity in his spiritual autobiography, Surprised
by Joy:
I felt a resistance almost as strong as my previous resistance to Theism. As strong,
but short-lived, for I understood it better. Every step I had taken, from the Absolute to
'Spirit' to 'God', had been a step towards the more concrete, the more imminent, the
more compulsive ... I know very well when, but hardly how, the final step was taken.
I was driven to Whipsnade one sunny morning. When we set out I did not believe that
Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and when we reached the zoo I did. Yet I had not
exactly spent the journey in thought. Nor in great emotion. 'Emotional' is perhaps the
last word we can apply to some of the most important events. It was more like when a
man, after long sleep, still lying motionless in bed, becomes aware that he is now
awake."
For Lewis, the continual attempt to satisfy unsatisfied desire found its end in the concrete person
and work of Jesus Christ-the Myth that became Fact. Upon being awakened, Lewis' view of
Sehnsucht had been retrospectively transformed. It became valuable only as a pointer to
something other and outer-to God himself.
So what, now, of Joy? Is there room for it and other 'Romantic' experiences within the
context of our Lutheran theology? And how does this relate to the tension between lived
experience and believed language? Upon further reflection, it appears that the heart of our
Lutheran theology rests precisely upon 'Romantic' experience. It is by participating in (looking
23 Ibid., 72.
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both at and along) this experience that the tension, in a sense, is resolved. For, in this Word-
formed and mythic ritual, language and experience become unified and we experience as a
concrete reality what otherwise would remain a mere abstraction. C. S. Lewis expresses this well
in his poem, No Beauty We Could Desire:
Yes, you are always everywhere. But I,
Hunting in such immeasurable forests,
Could never bring the noble hart to bay.
The scent was too perplexing for my hounds;
Nowhere sometimes, then again everywhere.
Other scents, too, seemed to them almost the same.
Therefore I turn my back on the unapproachable
Stars and horizons and all musical sounds,
Poetry itself, and the winding stair of thought.
Leaving the forests where you are pursued in vain
--Often a mere white gleam--I turn instead
To the appointed place where you pursue.
Not in Nature, not even in Man, but in one
Particular Man, with a date, so tall, weighing
So much, talking Aramaic, having learned a trade;
Not in all food, not in all bread and wine
(Not, I mean, as my littleness requires)
But this wine, this bread ...no beauty we could desire."
The reality of God's one reconciling work in Jesus Christ, which becomes actualized in
us and for us in a real and mysterious way at the Lord's Supper," is the answer to unsatisfied
desire. For, at this sacred (and yet quite ordinary) table, worlds collide, and there is "the marriage
of heaven and earth: Perfect Myth and Perfect Fact: claiming not only our love and our
24 C. S. Lewis, Surprised by Joy, 237.
25 C. S. Lewis, Poems (New York: Harcourt, 2002), 124.
26 This is not to say that we only experience this concrete reality in the Lord's Supper, for the Holy Spirit can
work through the Word when and where he pleases, but we can be sure that we experience this concrete reality
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obedience, but also our wonder and delight.'?" At this table, we are brought into fellowship with
the Myth that became Fact, and confirmed and nourished in our identity as children of God
through his pardon and power. When we learn to rest in the divine reality of this identity through
God's Word and promise, we are free to celebrate the 'Romantic' elements of human experience
in creation and culture, as God continually transforms and sanctifies our created nature (with its
desires) through his one reconciling work in Jesus Christ. For in Jesus Christ, desire has been and
will be fully satisfied.
Conclusion
It is true, as St. Augustine famously said-"you [God] have made us for yourself, and our
heart is restless until it rests in yoU."28While this might seem to make the Christian life a selfish
and egocentric affair (as Beversluis and Nygren would most likely argue), part of the problem
may be that we fail to read the words immediately surrounding this well-known maxim: "You
stimulate him [man] to take pleasure in praising you ... [A]nd they that find Him shall praise
Him."29 As Meilaender writes, "It seems right that we should desire to be in the presence of the
God who made us, but the desire Augustine here articulates cannot be described as a merely
selfish desire to possess God. His desire is not to possess but to praise.'?" And while our journey
towards praising and resting in God will certainly be marked with experiences of pain and self-
sacrifice, "we should not speak of the way (self-sacrifice) as ifit were the goal Goy in God's
particularly in the Lord's Supper.
27 c. S. Lewis, "Myth Became Fact," 66.
28St. Augustine, Confessions, 3.
29Ibid., 3.
30 Gilbert Meilaender, The Way that Leads There: Augustinian Reflections on the Christian Life (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 10.
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presencej.''" For if we do, we will inevitably lose what C. S. Lewis refers to as our joy in total
dependence: "For this tangled absurdity of a Need ... Grace substitutes a full, childlike and
delighted acceptance of our Need, ajoy in total dependence. We become 'jolly beggars.":"
Beggars-because we are creatures of deep need (Wir sind Bettler: hoc est verumy." Jolly-
because God has met that need in Jesus Christ, filling our empty hands with riches beyond which
there is no beauty we could desire.
31 Ibid., 21.
32 C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960), 131.




PERSONAL EXPERIENCES WITH SEHNSUCHT
Generally, Sehnsucht appears most often during childhood. 1 For most, the question is not
whether or not they have experienced Sehnsucht, but rather whether or not they can remember it.
Many things can evoke it-a story, a place, a season, a smell-but it is important to note that it
cannot be manufactured or produced. What aroused Sehnsucht at one moment may not
necessarily bring it about at a later moment. It can be seen as functioning as the wardrobe in
Lewis' The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe: the Pevensie children accidentally stumbled into
Narnia through it, but when they expected to enter through it they found the door closed.
My first memory of Sehnsucht occurred when I was around three or four years old. My
parents attended an adult Bible-study, and while the adults were upstairs talking, the kids were
sent downstairs to play. On one specific week we were left downstairs to view the BBC film
version of The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, and as I sat there watching, I felt as if! had
entered another dimension of the world-a dimension that could be described as nothing other
than magical. In a way, Narnia felt more real to me than life? I did not know what the adults
were talking about upstairs, nor did I care, I had glimpsed what I thought to be the secret of the
universe, and I was determined to discover more of this divine mystery.
1 At least it did for me. The case could be made that children have a better ability to view the world with a
sense of wonder and enchantment. As we grow older we often become numb to the 'magic' of the ordinary
surrounding us. This is by no means always the case, and often times old age returns with a renewed sense of awe.
In order to further clarify, it is important to note here that Sehnsucht, in Lewis' sense, is not longing for the past (for
if this were the case then children would not experience it), but rather for something other and outer that we have
never fully seen or realized.
2 What I eventually came to fmd out was that life was a lot more like Narnia than I had then realized. It is the
'everyday' occurrences that now seem the most enchanted. G. K. Chesterton was the first bring this to my attention.
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Ever since that moment I have been haunted by recurrent stirrings of Sehnsucht: from the
yearly trips to grandma's house at Christmastime (full of presents waiting to be opened, freshly
fallen snow, a crackling fire, and the bittersweet taste of grandma's hot-fudge that was only to be
enjoyed once a year), to the first smell of Fall (a perfect mixture of burning leaves, cool-crisp air,
and trees rustling with their changing colors); from the alluring piano melodies of George
Winston, to the fairy-tales which I knew were not true but nevertheless seemed real. Amidst
these and many more encounters with Sehnsucht, I was vexed with desire and longing. I did not
know for what, but I knew that at its core the world was filled with beauty and meaning, and I
wanted to share in this beauty and meaning with everyone I loved and cared for. To be sure, I
knew something had gone drastically wrong with the world (for how else could there be so much
suffering, pain, and evil?), but my experiences with Sehnsucht brought with them the hope that
things would one day be put to rights. Of this I was sure.
In high school I was introduced to the apologetic writings of C. S. Lewis. Here was the
man who served to awaken Sehnsucht in my childhood, and who now was the first to put into
words that which I thought was inexpressible. For the first time, I realized that I was not alone in
my secret--others felt it too. I slowly began to open up and hint to others of my experiences, and
I actively inquired into how Sehnsucht fit within my wider Lutheran theological framework. But,
to my chagrin, there not only seemed to be little room for it to fit, there seemed to be a general
consensus that it was theologically suspect. "God only speaks through Word and Sacrament," I
was told, "so there is no room for him to speak in these 'Romantic' experiences." I knew and
agreed that God spoke through Word and Sacrament, but I also believed that there were lived
experiences that pointed to the beauty, glory, and majesty of God. On the one hand, I held to
theological language that repressed 'Romantic' experience; on the other hand, I was existentially
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sure that there was room for 'Romantic' experience within orthodox Lutheran theology.' By
looking at I came to one conclusion, by looking along I came to another; this led to a type of
compartmentalization between the language I believed and the experiences I lived. I have been
wrestling with this tension ever since.
3 Take, for instance, the sacraments. What can be more 'Romantic' than God's presence in, with, and under the
physical elements of bread and wine? But this was not pointed out to me, it was explained to me. I approached a
mystery with a rational explanation. I primarily looked at the Lord's Supper within a rational theological system
rather than looking along and at the fellowship of the Lord's Supper as a ritual within the Divine narrative.
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